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ABSTRACT 
 
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE: 
FACTORS INFLUENCING ANGEL INVESTOR DECISIONS 
by 
Robert C. Forrester 
 
 
 Angel investors are individual investors who invest in high-risk projects 
without the assistance of professional portfolio advisors and are an important 
source of early-stage entrepreneurial financing.  When providing financing, an 
angel must decide how much time to spend on due diligence, the amount of wealth 
invested, and the degree of post-investment interaction with entrepreneurs.  As they 
are individual investors, angels may be particularly influenced by behavioral 
factors.  In order to provide insight into the investment decisions of angel investors 
this dissertation examines angel investor and deal characteristics including 
demographics, experience, perception of the management team, the source that led 
the entrepreneur to the angel investor, and syndication status.  The dissertation 
finds that angels’ decisions are influenced by rational and behavioral factors, such 
as cognitive biases and social influences.  While there is strong evidence that 
experienced angel investors spend more time on due diligence, older investors 
spend less time on due diligence after controlling for investor experience.  These 
results suggest that experienced angels invest in due diligence because they 
understand its importance.  Gender, risk perception, venture stage, and source of 
deal identification also influence due diligence. In addition, older angels are found 
to invest a smaller percentage of their wealth in a deal, perhaps because they seek 
 vii 
 
to diversify holdings.  More experienced angels, however, are found to invest a 
larger percentage of their wealth perhaps because experienced angels are more 
susceptible to cognitive biases such as overconfidence, or because they are able to 
identify ventures that will do well and choose to invest more in such ventures.  
Deal syndication also influences the percent of wealth invested in a deal.  Other 
results suggest that after making an investment, angels continue to interact with the 
companies they invest in.  There is strong evidence that more experienced angels 
are associated with greater post-investment interaction.  Gender and risk perception 
also influence the degree of post-investment interaction. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 In traditional finance theory, the predominant view is that people behave 
rationally, making unbiased decisions based on relevant information (Statman, 1995; von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944).  However, individual investors’ decisions that violate 
principles of traditional finance have bedeviled researchers for years (Baker & Nofsinger, 
2010; Barberis & Thaler, 2003; Fama, 1998; Miller, 1986; Shefrin, 2000; Statman, 1995; 
Statman, 1999; Shiller, 2003; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944).  Indeed, scholars 
have concluded that behavioral elements in decision making are likely to be more 
influential on individual investors compared with large investors or institutional investors 
who rely on professional portfolio advisors and that knowledge of factors which 
influence individual investors is incomplete (Barberis & Thaler, 2003; Fama, 1998; 
Schleifer 2000; Shefrin, 2000; Thaler, 1999).  This dissertation provides insight into 
factors that influence the observed decisions of angel investors which appear to violate 
the principles of traditional finance, such as investing in high risk projects that contain 
high information asymmetry while performing relatively little due diligence.  Moreover, 
it explores variables that lead angel investors to invest time in due diligence, as well as to 
invest capital in projects.  An underpinning of this research is behavioral finance. 
 Angel investors are an important source of early-stage financing. Typically, angel 
investors are individual investors who invest in high-risk, entrepreneurial projects 
without the assistance of professional portfolio advisors.  Angel investors invest billions 
of dollars in thousands of startup companies and entrepreneurial projects annually 
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(DeGennaro & Dwyer, 2013; Mason & Harrison, 2000; Sohl, 1999).  Despite significant 
financial commitment, angel investor decisions sometimes appear to violate the 
principles of traditional finance.  For example, rational investors have been shown to 
spend time on due diligence to reduce information asymmetry and increase return on 
investments. Indeed, time spent on due diligence has been shown to be positively related 
to angel investor returns on investment.  Some angels, though, spend no time on due 
diligence (Morrissette, 2007; Sohl, 2003a; Wiltbank & Boeker, 2007b).  Wiltbank and 
Boeker (2007b) report that amount of time angel investors spend on due diligence ranges 
between zero and 5,000 hours per investment.  Despite angel investors’ growth and 
significance, very little research has examined factors that lead angel investors to expend 
time on due diligence as well as to invest in projects.  They are one of the most common 
and least studied sources for financing new ventures (Wong, Bhatia & Freeman, 2009).   
Data used to examine individual investors not using professional portfolio advisors has 
been difficult to obtain.  Moreover, studies examining the choices made by individual 
investors have been limited.  Increasing availability of data on angel investors, however, 
provides an ideal opportunity to examine factors influencing individual investor decision 
making (Gompers & Lerner, 2010; Kaplan & Stromberg, 2003; Kerr, Lerner & Schoar, 
2011; Prowse, 1998; Van Osnabrugge & Robinson, 2000). Understanding factors that 
guide angel decisions should assist in increasing their returns and help ensure their 
continued contribution to national economic growth.   
 Behavioral finance is a relatively new field that combines behavioral and 
cognitive psychology with traditional finance to provide explanations for why investors 
make decisions that appear to be irrational (Ackert & Deaves, 2009; Baker & Nofsinger, 
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2010; Hirshleifer, 2001; Pompian, 2011; Statman, 1999).  Although traditional finance 
assumes that individual investors make decisions that are rational, empirical evidence 
suggests that deviations from the traditional model are persistent and predictable (Ackert 
& Deaves, 2009; Fama, 1998; Shleifer, 2000).  Behavioral finance researchers have made 
significant contributions to understanding the factors that influence individual investors, 
yet the picture is incomplete (Barberis & Thaler, 2003; Fama, 1998; Shleifer, 2000; 
Shefrin, 2000; Thaler, 1999).   
 Behavioral finance guides the present research by providing enhanced 
understanding of individual investors and factors that motivate their decisions under 
conditions of risk.  Angel investors have to make decisions on many important issues, 
including time spent on due diligence, percent of wealth to be invested, and post-
investment interaction with entrepreneurs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Maxwell, Jeffrey & 
Lévesque, 2011; Sohl, 2003b; DeGennaro & Dwyer, 2013). To better understand 
investors’ decisions, demographics such as age, gender, and education (Becker-Blease & 
Sohl, 2011; Dwyer, Gilkeson & List, 2002; Fünfgeld & Wang, 2009; Harrison & Mason, 
2007) are analyzed.  The influence of prior experience (Dimov, Shepherd, & Sutcliffe, 
2007; Gustaffson, 2006; Mitteness, Baucus & Sudek, 2012), risk tolerance  (Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1990; Gompers, 1995; Hambrick & Mason,1984; Michel & Hambrick, 
1992; Murray, 1989;  Wiltbank & Boeker, 2007b; Wright  & Robbie, 1996), and 
syndication (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1994; Gompers & Lerner, 2001) are also utilized.  
These variables have been utilized in prior finance research, but have not been used 
collectively to understand angel investor behavior. 
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 Prior research related to factors that shape angel investor behavior has included 
angel investor due diligence analysis and its impact on returns (Wiltbank & Boeker, 
2007b), differences in due diligence between angel investors and venture capital (Van 
Osnabrugge, 2000), due diligence analysis and impact on expected returns (DeGennaro, 
2011), as well as angel investor experience effects on learning (Smith, Harrison & 
Mason, 2010). However, little prior research has examined factors that influence angel 
investor decisions of time on due diligence, amount of wealth to be invested, and post-
investment interactions.   
 This dissertation contributes to the knowledge base of entrepreneurial finance, 
angel investors, and factors that affect individual investor decisions.  This dissertation is 
important for several reasons.  First, using the context of angel investors enhances 
understanding of alternative investor situations where investors make decisions without 
the benefit of professional portfolio advisors.  Second, understanding angel investor 
decisions regarding the amount of time spent on due diligence leads to further insight into 
antecedent factors to consider when assessing effectiveness of angel investor pre-
investment decision behavior and processes.  Also, investigating due diligence offers 
increased knowledge about information asymmetry in entrepreneurial finance.   
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CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
Although angel investing has grown significantly, little is known about factors 
that influence decisions of angel investors and drive their returns on investment.  Angel 
investors invest billions in new ventures each year, and the number of angel investor 
groups has grown 67 percent since 1969, so both their size and importance are growing 
(DeGennaro & Dwyer, 2013; Mason & Harrison, 2000; Sohl, 1999; Wiltbank & Boeker, 
2007a).   
Angel Investing  
An angel investor is a person who provides capital, in the form of debt or equity, 
from his/her own funds to a private business (Shane, 2012).  Angels are typically high 
net-worth individuals who provide investment capital during the risky early-stage of new 
ventures (Acs & Tarpley, 1998; Benjamin & Margulis, 2001; Morrissette, 2007; Wong, 
Bhatia & Freeman, 2009).  These investors can be characterized as a source of informal 
risk capital, i.e. capital that is invested by private individuals directly (informally) for an 
entrepreneur’s use without formal intermediation by an institution, such as a bank 
(Berger & Udell, 1998; Diamond, 1984). 
 Angel investors fall into the category of private equity investors (Benjamin & 
Margulis, 2001; Berger & Udell, 1998; Fenn & Liang; 1998; Prowse, 1998).  Private 
equity is equity capital financing in equity securities that are not quoted or traded on a 
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public exchange.  Whereas public stock and bond markets that fund large businesses are 
relatively transparent owing to oversight (e.g., reported financials, analysts’ reports), 
private markets that finance small businesses are often opaque, which makes investing in 
them more risky (Berger & Udell, 1998; Kerr, Lerner & Schoar, 2011).  Although the 
quantity of external private equity investments is less than that of public investments, the 
quality (as measured by the success of the businesses) of the investments has positively 
influenced entrepreneurs and communities (Berger & Udell, 1998).  The critical private 
equity needed to fund these firms can be from private equity firms, angel investors, or 
venture capital firms.  Angel investors are similar to venture capitalists in several ways, 
including that both have similar expectations for required returns, exit horizons, and 
working relationships to assist the firms in which they invest (Freear, Sohl, & Wetzel, 
1995).    
 Angel investors invest in deals having various characteristics, including 
investment size, management experience, industry, and proposed exit strategies (Van 
Osnabrugge & Robinson, 2000).  For example, Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000) 
find that the average deal size ranges from $50,000 to $150,000 for each angel investor.  
Several researchers find that, although angels will invest during different stages of an 
investment, seed and start-up stage companies are more than three-quarters of all angel 
projects (DeGennaro & Dwyer, 2013; Freear, Sohl, & Wetzel, 2000; Freear & Wetzel, 
1989; Sohl, 2003a).    
 The early stage is crucial in fostering new venture growth.  Early-stage 
investments are considered high-risk and often result in a wide array of investment 
returns (Van Osnabrugge, 2000; Wong, Bhatia & Freeman, 2009). As an example of the 
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risk involved in early stage investing, angel returns can range from total losses of an 
entire investment to yields of 50% or more (Collewaert, 2012; Mason & Harrison, 2002; 
Preston, 2011).  The limited financial history of new start-ups contributes to their reduced 
access to capital markets, including bond markets, banks, and even vendor debt capital 
opportunities, resulting in decreased available financing opportunities for early-stage 
entrepreneurs.  This early-stage investing increases the importance of angel investors, 
because entrepreneurs at this juncture often need a bridge of capital between family and 
friends and capital markets (Ibrahim, 2008).  Additionally, the amount of time before 
realizing a return can be much longer than a typical investment--often taking several 
years relative to other types of investments where returns may be more immediate 
(DeGennaro & Dwyer, 2013; Ibrahim, 2008; Mason & Harrison, 2002).   
 Angel investors may be driven by financial or non-financial benefits, such as 
greed and fear (Morrissette, 2007; Sullivan & Miller, 1996). Some angels are clear about 
their greed motivations, such as the desire to make “10 times their money and selling out” 
(Hill & Power, 2002, p.36).  Considering that around one-third of investments end in 
bankruptcy, the fear of failure may well be a valid concern (Mason & Harrison, 2002).   
Behavioral Finance 
 Development of behavioral finance. 
 Traditional finance. 
 A brief review of traditional finance is helpful in understanding the contribution 
of behavioral finance. Modern portfolio theory (MPT) is a traditional finance theory 
developed by Markowitz (1952a) to describe optimal portfolio formation by maximizing 
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return for a given level of risk.  MPT is important for several reasons.  It provides us with 
enhanced understanding of investors and their motivations, as well as firm measures that 
drive portfolio selection (Elton, Gruber, Brown & Goetzman, 2009; Fama, 1980).  It also 
offers direction for improving firm information to achieve efficient selection, thus 
fostering maximized portfolio expected returns for a given amount of risk (Markowitz, 
1952a).  In the Markowitz (1952a) algorithm, a person would identify a number of 
outcomes and assign a probability of occurrence for a given outcome as well as a return 
for the outcome.  The expected return represents the average of the possible returns for 
each asset, and uncertainty is represented by the standard deviation.  Under this mean-
variance framework, people are risk averse in all their choices.  By the late 20th and early 
21st century, the application of MPT gained ground in the investment and academic 
communities.  MPT appears to occupy a permanent place in the theory and practice of 
finance.   
However, in recent years MPT has been challenged by academics in the field of 
behavioral economics and finance who contend that the effects of social, cognitive, and 
emotional factors also influence individual decisions.  For example, Sullivan (1991) finds 
that return on investment is not the primary motivation of one-third of angel investors.  
Primary motivations of these angels included the fun of an interesting investment and the 
enjoyment of an active role in starting a company.  Other non-financial benefits include 
creation of jobs within a community, networking, or being a part of a group that is 
making local investments (Freear, Sohl, & Wetzel, 1995; Linde, Prasad, Morse, 
Utterback, Stevenson & Roberts, 2000).  Other angel investor non-financial motivations 
include enjoyment of helping start a new firm or assisting entrepreneurs (Leonard & 
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Swap, 2000).  Leonard and Swap (2000) refer to angels as “mentor capitalists,” a 
reference to their enjoyment and participation in helping entrepreneurs with their new 
ventures. 
 The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is a classic theory in traditional finance.  
It describes market prices of stocks based on the rationality of the market and market 
participants rapidly using available information, providing unbiased estimates of their 
values.  The emerging discipline of behavioral finance has challenged the EMH on the 
basis that markets are not rational and are driven by other factors, such as fear and greed 
(Lo, 2004; Malkiel & Fama, 1970; Samuelson, 1965).  Lo (2004) introduces the adaptive 
market hypothesis (AMH), which builds on psychology of human behavior 
characteristics (e.g., altruism, fairness, morality, ethics) that create human biases and help 
explain market dynamics.  This evolutionary perspective suggests that individuals make 
choices based on past experiences and receipt of positive or negative reinforcement.  
Individuals thus develop heuristics, or rules of thumb, that enable them to adapt to 
economic challenges and achieve optimal solutions (Lo, 2004; Reuber & Fischer, 1994).  
 Under traditional finance, a rational person is assumed to have consistent 
preferences, or utilities, among different things.  Expected utility theory has been the 
dominant theory for analysis of decision making under risk and is widely accepted as the 
normative model of rational choice.  Expected utility theory assumes that all reasonable 
people will follow the principles of the theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).   
 A utility function is a tool aimed at helping a rational person make decisions 
among choices when risk is involved.  In expected utility theory, the utility function 
assigns weight rankings to an individual’s preferences, with higher numbers given to 
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more preferred outcomes.  Therefore, the weighted average of all possible levels of utility 
will best represent the utility at any given point of time for an individual.  Although 
expected utility theory has been a dominant theory in the examination of decision making 
under conditions of risk, an individual’s choices among risky prospects often exhibit 
effects that are inconsistent with utility theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  An 
example of individual behavior that contradicts expected utility theory is the certainty 
effect.  The certainty effect is a phenomenon that occurs when people overweight 
outcomes that are considered certain relative to outcomes that are merely probable and is 
inconsistent with expected utility theory (Allais, 1953).  Several variations of the Allais 
example assist in explaining the phenomenon.  Below is an example of the Allais paradox 
as depicted in Kahneman & Tversky (1979): 
Problem 1: Choose between 
 A: 2,500 with probability   .33  B: 2,400 with certainty 
         2,400 with probability   .66 
           0        with probability   .01  
      
Problem 2: Choose between  
 C: 2,500 with probability    .33  D: 2,400 with probability   .34 
      0 with probability           .67       0 with probability          .66     
In Problem 1, the majority of people (over 80%) prefer option B; thus, they are choosing 
certainty over risk and are willing to trade away the potential for an additional 100 for the 
guarantee of 2,400.  In Problem 2, most people choose option C; thus suggesting that 
.33u(2,500) > .34u(2,400). The choice selected in either Problem 1 or Problem 2 did not 
represent irrational behavior.  However, the combination of selections in Problems 1 and 
2  - which were made by most people – represented inconsistency in the linear probability 
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decision making and the independence axiom described in expected utility theory.  The 
results of the Allais examples suggest that individuals value certainty an inordinate 
amount and this influences decisions.  These results exemplify that attitudes towards risk 
or chance cannot be captured by the expected utility model (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). 
 The analysis of the Allais paradox by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) resulted in 
the conclusion that individuals do not always make decisions upon complete information.  
Their research suggests that people make decisions based on gains and losses and not in 
terms of their state of wealth.  Thus, they suggest that people dislike losses and dislike 
risk in general and they feel the disadvantages of losses more than they feel the 
advantages of gains.  Kahneman and Tversky (1979) reveal the bias built into most 
individuals and offered prospect theory as a critique and alternative to expected utility 
theory. 
 Prospect theory and behavioral finance. 
 Prospect theory is a behavioral theory that suggests individuals make decisions 
based on potential losses and gains relative to a reference point rather than the final 
outcome of the decisions.  The theory is developed to model real-life choices and 
incorporate an explanation of the inconsistencies and seeming irrationality that more 
accurately describe human decision making under risk as compared to expected utility 
theory.   
 The decision weight associated with an event depends primarily on the perceived 
likelihood of that event and could be subject to major biases and heuristics (Kahneman & 
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Tversky, 1979).  Thus, individuals will decide which outcomes are considered equivalent 
and utilize these as a reference point; then the outcomes that are greater are considered as 
gains and those which are less are considered as losses as shown in the figure below.  The 
value of the reference point can be determined by the perception of the individual 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  The dependence on the individual’s perception or 
preferences on the decision problem is a significant concern (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981).  The preferences may be influenced when a problem is framed in different ways.  
For example, our perception is attuned to the evaluation of changes rather than absolute 
magnitude.  Thus, the gain in value between 100 and 200 appears to be greater than the 
difference between 1,100 and 1,200 and the loss of 100 to 200 may appear larger than the 
loss of 1,100 and a loss of 1,200 (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).   
 The reference point used to evaluate utility in expected utility theory is the 
amount of wealth, whereas in prospect theory the value of an outcome is measured based 
on changes in wealth.  The same level of wealth may imply poverty for one person and 
great riches for another depending on their current assets (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
Note that the prospect theory value function is defined on the reference point, concave for 
gains and convex for losses and steeper for losses than gains and steepest at the reference 
point. 
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Figure 1. Prospect theory value function. 
 
 Under prospect theory, individuals can determine their own risk preferences based 
on certain heuristics and biases.  Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argue that the use of 
probabilistic alternatives involving risk addresses some of the weaknesses in expected 
utility theory, including that people value and apply more weight to what is certain than 
what is merely probable.  A person is considered risk averse if he prefers the certain 
prospect over the risky prospect and the risk aversion is equivalent to the concavity of the 
utility function  (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  With the certainty effect, it appears that 
certainty increases the aversiveness of losses and the desirability of gains.  In contrast, in 
expected utility theory changes in risk preference would be considered as a violation of 
the principles of the theory.  Additionally, an individual’s simplification of prospects can 
lead him to discard events of low probability and treat events of high probability as if 
they were certain or overweight low probability events.  This concept that individuals 
may either ignore or overweight highly unlikely events through their inability to 
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comprehend and evaluate extreme probabilities suggests that the difference between 
certainty and high probability is either neglected or exaggerated (Shefrin & Statman, 
2003).   
 Common examples of overweighting outcomes based on the probability and size 
of the loss are the purchase of insurance and the practice of gambling.  Individuals will 
purchase insurance to cover against large and small losses, even when the price of the 
policies exceeds the actuarial costs, an example of risk aversion.  Another example of 
overweighting low probability outcomes is when individuals purchase lottery tickets.  
Because the odds of winning the lottery are extremely slim, purchasing lottery tickets is 
considered risk-seeking behavior.  However, the preference for the low potential of a 
large gain (lottery winning) over the preference of the small loss of the cost of the lottery 
ticket suggests that the value function for losses is convex.  Interestingly, the same person 
who exhibits the risk-seeking behavior of purchasing a lottery ticket may also exhibit risk 
averse behavior, such as purchasing insurance to reduce risk or avoid a loss (Markowitz, 
1952b), which is another example of a violation of the expected utility theory.  
 The reference, or value point, in prospect theory becomes more relevant when 
considering attitudes towards risk (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988).  Although the 
relationship between risk and return is commonly considered to be positively correlated, 
some studies have found that there is a negative correlation (Armour & Teece, 1978; 
Bowman, 1980, 1982; Treacy, 1980).  Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggest that 
individuals use value or reference points in evaluating risky choices.   
 Tversky and Kahneman (1991) developed a theoretical framework based on an 
individual’s choice that depends on a reference level or the status quo.  This reference-
15 
 
 
 
dependent theory includes assumptions that alternatives are evaluated relative to a 
reference point and each choice can be decomposed into its own set of attributes and 
those attributes also have their own value function.  Prospect theory was originally 
developed to describe choices between simple risky prospects with single attributes 
(money) and few outcomes. Tversky and Kahneman (1991) suggest that prospect theory 
should be expanded to include multiple attributes.  Reference dependence and loss 
aversion with multiple attributes were studied by Hardie, Johnson and Fader (1993).  The 
authors examined brand choice in loss aversion and reference dependence.  Their 
findings suggest that multiple attributes can influence evaluation and can be seen as gains 
or losses relative to a reference point in the attribute space.   
 Behavioral finance is useful in examining angel investor economic and financial 
inconsistencies.  Behavioral finance combines behavioral and cognitive psychological 
theory with conventional economics and finance to understand decisions investors make 
(Ackert & Deaves, 2009; Ritter, 2003; Shiller, 2003).  Psychologists have been studying 
decision heuristics for decades (Debondt & Thaler, 1985; Slovic, 1969, Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1975; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Shefrin & Statman, 1985).  These studies 
examine how and why decision makers reach outcomes focusing on the actual outcome 
itself.  Human behavior is a result of investors processing information using shortcuts and 
emotional filters (Baker & Nofsinger, 2010).  These shortcuts and emotional filters can 
result in suboptimal investor decisions.  These decisions may seem to be irrational and 
violate the traditional assumption of risk aversion.  Behavioral finance attempts to better 
understand what seems to be the suboptimal investor decisions, particularly those that 
impact markets and personal wealth.   
16 
 
 
 
 This dissertation examines behavioral factors that lead angel investors to invest in 
projects, to invest time in due diligence, as well as the role due diligence and information 
asymmetry have on angel investor probability of success.  Another difference in this 
study and other angel investor studies is the consideration of the behavioral factors that 
influence angel investor decisions and the angel investor’s assessment of deal 
characteristics that influence his/her behavior. Angel investor decisions are examined 
based on traditional finance theory and behavioral finance.  Modern portfolio theory, 
expected utility theory, and prospect theory are utilized to examine angel investing and 
information asymmetry.   
 The assessment of risk. 
 The level of risk is clearly an important factor when an investor is assessing 
opportunities.  Friedman and Savage (1948) note that individuals frequently choose 
among alternatives that differ based on degree of risk.  For example, in prospect theory, 
the decision weight associated with an event will depend primarily on the perceived 
likelihood of that event, which could be subject to major biases (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979).  In contrast, under the traditional approach, the rational decision maker is assumed 
to be risk averse and, therefore, would require additional reward to accept increased risk 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  However, assessing the probabilities of all outcomes can 
be difficult, as people cannot be aware of all possible outcomes.   
 Risk assessments and considerations in traditional angel investments include 
investment stage, top management experience, number of co-investors, and overall risk 
perceptions (Wiltbank, 2005).  However, biases and heuristics influence people’s 
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decisions that are not explained by traditional finance.  Therefore, behavioral finance 
provides key insights to assist in understanding these decisions (Ackert & Deaves, 2009; 
Baker & Nofsinger, 2010; Statman, 1999).   
 Biases and heuristics. 
 Factors that influence decisions, including biases and heuristics, have received 
significant attention from behavioral finance researchers.  Bias refers to people’s 
tendency to make decisions based on cognitive factors, such as memory, attention, 
learning, problem solving, and heuristics, rather than evidence—and thus can include 
errors in judgment (Barberis, Shleifer & Vishny, 1998; Bem, 1965; Daniel, Hirshleifer & 
Subrahmanyam, 1998; Fama, 1998).  Heuristics refers to experience-based techniques for 
problem solving and learning, such as rules of thumb, to reduce the search necessary to 
find the solution to a problem (Shefrin, 2000; Tversky & Kahneman, 1975). Biases and 
heuristics often influence people’s decisions. Shefrin (2000, p. x) notes: “People are not 
good processors of information and are frequently subject to bias, error, and perceptual 
illusions.”   
 Bias factors that may influence investor decisions include risk perception, 
framing, and overconfidence (Dimov, Shepherd & Sutcliffe, 2007; Mitteness, Sudek & 
Cardon, 2012; Peters, Burraston & Mertz, 2004).  Even if entrepreneurs provide the same 
information to all angel investors, the information may be perceived differently based on 
the angels’ biases and past experiences.  The angel investor’s previous experience and 
expertise allows them to focus on key areas while ignoring other areas, thus influencing 
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their biases and heuristics and helping them be more efficient (Dimov, Shepherd & 
Sutcliffe, 2007).   
 Cognitive bias. 
Whereas traditional finance represents rational people who want more wealth over 
less and are never confused over the forms of wealth, behavioral finance is populated by 
“normal” people who are affected by cognitive biases and emotions, confused by the 
forms of wealth, and are not always motivated by the desire to have more wealth 
(Statman, 2008).  Sometimes, the so-called “normal” people want other things, such as 
more status or social responsibility and are willing to accept less wealth to achieve such 
goals (Statman, 2008).  
 Prior studies suggest that a dramatic influence on investments is the most recent 
investment an investor has participated in (Previtero, 2012).  The most recent investment 
influence may be due to recall.  Ebbinghaus (1902) examined recall accuracy as a 
function of cognitive bias.  Recall or memory can create a bias based on primacy or 
recency.  Primacy is recalling information that is presented earlier or in a better manner 
than information that is presented later on.  Recency refers to items or events that are 
most recently examined having a memory advantage over items retrieved from long-term 
memory.  The primacy and recency effects and whether or not an investor has invested in 
a project in the past may influence investor behavior.  The influence of investor past 
success can lead to overconfidence, less diversification, and more risk taking (Merkle, 
2012).   
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 Loss aversion, risk aversion and level of wealth 
 Another key feature of the major biases addressed in prospect theory is loss 
aversion.  Loss aversion is the tendency, for most people, to weigh losses larger than 
gains.  Whereas people in a mean-variance framework are risk averse in all choices, 
under prospect theory people are risk averse in the gains domain and risk seeking relative 
to losses.  Furthermore, the influence of the certainty effect causes people to prefer a 
smaller sure gain over a larger gain that is only probable, and the same effect leads to a 
preference for a smaller loss that is only probable over a sure loss that is certain.  The 
concept of loss aversion is a psychological consideration that drives an individual’s 
choice behavior in financial markets (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995). It can be impacted by 
how long one holds an investment or the extent of one’s loss aversion (Benartzi & Thaler, 
1995).  Olsen (1997) examines loss aversion and prospect theory and finds that both 
individual investors as well as groups of professionals have similar risk perspectives.  
Olsen identifies four main characteristics in investor perception of risk that influence 
their loss aversion: concern for a large loss, feeling of control, potential for a below-target 
return, and perceived degree of knowledge.  Olsen finds that risk perception explained 77 
percent of the variance in his analyses.  The most substantial factor in his analysis was 
the ability to sell an asset in a relatively short period of time without suffering a loss.  The 
liquidity risk of angel investments refers to the risk of not being able to effectively exit 
and thus being forced to remain in the venture or sell the investment at a high discount 
(Cumming, Fleming, & Schwienbacher, 2005).  
 Another example of loss aversion is in the stream of research on disposition effect 
(Heisler, 1994; Odean, 1998; Shefrin & Statman, 1985).  The disposition effect is 
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described as the investors’ disposition to sell winners too early and ride losers too long.  
This reluctance of investors to realize losses is an extension of Kahneman and Tversky’s 
(1979) prospect theory to investments.   
 The tendency for a risk averse investor to fall prey to the disposition effect may 
be influenced by illiquidity (Cumming, Fleming, & Schwienbacher, 2005). The critical 
point in an individual investor’s assessment of gains and losses is the reference point 
from which gains and losses are measured. Under prospect theory, the value function is 
defined as gains and losses from a particular reference point rather than on levels of 
wealth (see Figure 1).  The function is concave for gains and convex for losses and 
steeper for losses than for gains.  Usually the individual  reference point would be the 
cost or existing market value; however,  “there are situations in which gains and losses 
are coded relative to an expectation or aspiration level that differs from the status quo…A 
person who has not made peace with his losses is likely to accept gambles that would be 
unacceptable to him otherwise” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p.287).   
 Odean (1998) finds, for some investments, particularly those held over a long 
period of time, the purchase price is only one factor in determining a reference point; 
thus, the reference point may be a noisy proxy for the true reference point.  Rational 
reasons for holding losers and selling winners include selling winners to balance a 
portfolio, selling winners purchased on favorable information, believing they now reflect 
the favorable information and will not rise further, or holding after a price drop believing 
favorable information is not yet incorporated, and finally, to avoid higher trading costs 
associated with lower priced stocks.  However, even after controlling for rational 
motivations, Odean (1998) finds that investors continue to prefer to sell winners and hold 
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losers, which is consistent with prospect theory and the mistaken or irrational belief that 
the price of winners and losers will eventually move back towards the mean or average, a 
term called mean reversion.  Although Odean (1998) does not differentiate between 
irrational belief and mean reversion as to the reasons individuals hold losers and sell 
winners, he does suggest that they may not discern the difference, thus convincing 
themselves that a stock value may return rather than admit they are unwilling to take a 
loss.  Further, if expected future returns for the losers are greater than for the winners, the 
belief would be considered rational; however, if they are not and investors continue to 
hold losers against consistent indications that conflict with this belief, then this is 
considered irrational (Odean, 1998).   
 Ibrahim (2008) provides evidence that most angel contracts are rational from a 
financial perspective, yet the use of their personal funds gives angels the flexibility to 
invest in a project for financial as well as non-financial reasons, including personal 
reasons.  Odean (1998) also noted that, for some investments, particularly those held over 
a long period of time, the purchase price is only one factor for an individual to invest or 
to determine a reference point for an investment.  Other reasons may include the 
excitement and opportunity to participate in a new venture or a desire to give back to the 
community (Ibrahim, 2008).  These nonfinancial benefits, also described as “psychic 
income”, may shift the reference point for the value function for angel investors, thus 
creating additional expected value or gain and encouraging angels to hold on to 
investments for a longer period of time. 
 People’s preference to avoid losses over acquiring gains, which is to imply that a 
person who loses $100 will lose more satisfaction than a person that wins $100 gains in 
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satisfaction, is known as loss aversion high risk projects that contain high information 
asymmetry (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  Risk aversion attempts to explain the aversion 
behavior of people in conditions of uncertainty to reduce uncertainty in exchange for 
more certain or lower expected payoffs (Holt & Laury, 2002; Pratt, 1964).  Most people 
are risk averse in laboratory payoffs of several dollars; however, when payoffs are scaled 
up with higher payoffs in actual cash, subjects become sharply more risk averse (Holt & 
Laury, 2002).  Holt and Laury (2002, p.2) further state: “The nature of risk aversion (to 
what extent it exists, and how it depends on the size of the stake) is ultimately an 
empirical issue, and additional laboratory experiments can produce useful evidence that 
complements field observations by providing careful controls of probabilities and 
payoffs.”  Risk aversion affects the tendency to choose the safe option when payoffs are 
scaled up; however, the amount of increased payoff may be interpreted differently in 
relation to an individual’s final wealth.  For example, Cox and Sadiraj (2006) provide 
evidence that suggests that expected utility theory does not provide an explanation of 
how an agent’s initial wealth affects its attitude towards risk; thus, initial wealth must be 
considered separately from income in the utility function.  The authors extend the Arrow 
(1971) and Pratt (1964) characterization of risk aversion to consider a model in which 
risk attitude depends on initial wealth but income is not additive to initial wealth. Risk 
aversion and loss aversion literature suggests that when the same choice of prospects of 
gains and losses are presented in different forms, people generally have inconsistent 
preferences (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).   
 Studies that examine the percentage of wealth placed in risky assets when a 
portfolio is limited find that risk aversion is a decreasing function of the proportion of 
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total assets (Arrow, 1971; Pratt, 1964).  Prior studies, such as Cohn, Lewellen, Lease, and 
Schlarbaum (1975), have also investigated the effects of the percentage of wealth 
invested on allocation of individual portfolios to risky assets, as it influences the 
decisions of an investor.  Their findings suggest that, as wealth increases, there is a strong 
pattern of decreasing relative risk aversion.  Because investors are assumed to be rational, 
concepts of risk aversion that might influence them have been developed (Arrow, 1971; 
Pratt, 1964).   Angel investments appear to be influenced by the angel’s personal 
attributes, such as wealth.  For example, Chua and Wu (2012) suggest that the more 
ventures the angels have helped establish, the larger the amount of initial and total 
investment they make in an investment, which may also be a function of wealth.  Angel 
investors are typically wealthy individuals and former entrepreneurs themselves. The 
percentage of wealth can be a risk proxy for angel investor decisions (Chua & Wu, 2012; 
DeGennaro & Dwyer, 2013). 
 Framing. 
 Framing is the belief that how a concept is presented matters (Ritter, 2003). The 
way that investors frame an outcome affects the utility they expect to receive, such as 
changes in reference points, manipulations of probabilities, or decision weights 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  This critical point addresses how individuals evaluate 
risky gambles and embrace risky choice behavior.  Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argue 
that individuals use positive or negative frames in the decision making process.  Further, 
they find that when events are framed positively, individuals will choose the certain event 
over the gamble even if the gamble produces equal or greater expected value.  Individuals 
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will also choose a positively framed gamble over a negatively framed gamble even if they 
have equal values.  
 Tversky and Kahneman (1981) show that each decision choice has two specific 
phases: the initial phase where the event and related variables are framed and then the 
evaluation phase.  According to Tversky and Kahneman (1981), many concurrent 
decisions are framed independently, thus the preferences selected would be different if 
the decisions were combined. 
 Since individuals generally value an event based on the consequences expected, 
the events are considered to be evaluated based on mental accounting (Thaler, 1985; 
Thaler & Johnson, 1990).  People adopt mental accounting mode of framing because it 
simplifies the valuation process; it reflects the intuition that results will be linked to the 
factors in the event; and it reflects the sensitivity to the desirable or undesirable changes 
(Yazdipour & Howard, 2010).  When people are faced with evaluating huge amounts of 
data, information and decisions, they are incapable of making the complex calculations 
expected under traditional finance theory and instead rely on cognitive and heuristic 
based strategies found in mental accounting (Yazdipour & Howard, 2010).  Heuristics, 
which mainly result from the individual’s experiences, are imperfect and result in biases 
and errors.  Behavioralists argue that the heuristics and biases involved in framing are 
systematic, or characterized in a regular and methodical order, and thereby potentially 
last for long periods and affect decisions accordingly (Yazdipour & Howard, 2010). 
 According to traditional theory, the framing of an event should not impact its 
selection because the framing does not change the event; however, this reinforces the 
theory that individuals are subject to perceptual or cognitive illusions.  Behavioral 
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finance and prospect theory specifically address individual biases and heuristics that 
address how an investor employs judgment when faced with investment decisions 
involving risk. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) find that individuals tend to choose the 
certain event over the gamble even if the gamble yields an equal or greater expected 
value and will choose a positively framed gamble over a negatively framed one; thus 
providing evidence that individuals are subject to perceptual or cognitive illusion.  An 
example of cognitive illusion in framing decisions is found in DeGennaro and Dwyer 
(2013).  The authors examine past angel investments and argue that angels do not invest 
based on return on investment but rather on expected returns on investments.  Their study 
suggests a cognitive illusion surrounding the framing of angel investor returns.  They 
report angel investors earn returns that are similar to venture capital returns on similar 
industries, but the angels have framed a cognitive illusion of expected returns of  about 
70 percent per year in excess of the riskless rate compared with the reported expected 
returns for venture capitalists of 59 percent.  DeGennaro and Dwyer (2013) utilized the 
Angel Investor Performance Project data set employed in this dissertation (described 
subsequently).  
 Overconfidence. 
 Overconfidence is a bias that causes people to overestimate their knowledge, 
abilities, and judgment when making decisions.  Researchers have found that investors 
are overconfident about their abilities (Barber & Odean, 2001; Ritter, 2003).  
Overconfidence can manifest itself in many forms, including miscalibration, which 
occurs when people overestimate the precision of their knowledge.  Overconfidence can 
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also be seen in the better-than-average effect, which describes people’s tendency to rate 
themselves above average on their attributes or skills.  Another example of 
overconfidence is illusion of control.  Illusion of control occurs when people think they 
have more control over events than they actually have.  A fourth form of overconfidence, 
excessive optimism, is evident when people assign probabilities to an event that are too 
high/low based on historical experience or reasoning (Ackert & Deaves, 2009; 
Hirshleifer, 2001).   
 Previous research suggests that the angel investor’s expertise in the same industry 
as the investment, as well as angel investor interaction with the company they invested in, 
influences angel investment outcome (Wiltbank and Boeker, 2007b).  Angel investors 
analyze investment choices without the benefit of a professional portfolio advisor, thus 
performing their own analysis of potential investments.   
 In comparison to angel investors who perform their own analysis and professional 
analysts who typically provide important information in financial markets, some 
professional analysts perform their tasks better than others (Stickel, 1992; Sinha, Brown 
& Das, 1997).  Examinations of why some analysts perform better than others have 
resulted in conflicting results (Clement, 1999; Jacob, Lys & Neal, 1999; Mikhail, Walther 
& Willis, 1997).  Clement (1999) finds that more experienced analysts have smaller 
forecast errors.  Mikhail, Walther and Willis (1997) develop a model that suggests that as 
people practice a task, they improve and analysts with more experience issue more 
accurate forecasts.  However, Jacob, Lys and Neal (1999) argue that the association 
between experience and forecasting accuracy results not from experience, but from 
survival bias – weaker performers are forced out of the profession.   
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 As more information becomes available to investors, they tend to believe they can 
make better decisions (Zacharakis & Shepherd, 2001).  And, more information should 
enable the investor to avoid problems; however, the additional information may make the 
decision more complex due to contradictory information, and lack of full or proper 
analysis may lead to lower decision accuracy (Zacharakis & Shepherd, 2001). 
Evidence on the impact of experience on overconfidence has suggested that prior 
experience or familiarity influences overconfidence (Døskeland, & Hvide, 2011), but the 
directional influence of experience is foggy.  The conflicting role of experience has been 
addressed in psychology-based theories that suggest that experience enhances 
performance through its effects on knowledge (Dane, 2010; Hunter, 1983; Libby & Luft, 
1993; Schmidt, Hunter, & Outerbridge, 1986).  Inasmuch, experience has been viewed as 
a valuable asset that that does not directly affect performance.  This implies that 
experience provides opportunity for knowledge acquisition and greater knowledge 
improves performance (Koonce & Mercer, 2005).  Person-specific predictors of 
performance may include knowledge and ability, yet there may be significant variation in 
the complexity of tasks across firms and time (Koonce & Mercer, 2005).  Finally, 
experienced high-performers may underperform and be more of a burden in certain 
situations (Birch & Bloom, 2007; Dane, 2010; Frensch & Sternberg, 1989).   
In addition to overconfidence problems associated with high levels of experience, 
Frensch and Sternberg (1989) argue that those with significant experience may have well-
developed problem-solving routines and thus may be less flexible in their methodologies 
and ways of thinking than those less experienced, resulting in worse performance by 
highly experienced than less experienced analysts.  Dane (2010) agrees that as they 
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acquire domain experience experienced decision makers may lose flexibility with regard 
to problem solving, adaptation and creative idea generation; however, he argues that the 
inflexibility-related limitations can be circumvented.  Dane (2010) further suggests that 
the inflexibility arises, not from expertise, but from a high level of cognitive 
entrenchment.  He defines cognitive entrenchment as a high level of stability in one’s 
domain schema.  The problems associated with cognitive entrenchment may be 
restriction of ability to identify optimal solutions, adaptation in unique situations, and the 
ability to generate creative new ideas.  This cognitive entrenchment can be overcome by 
individuals focusing their attention on tasks not only within their area of expertise, but 
also outside their domain, which will also contribute to reduced information asymmetry 
problems.   
Information Asymmetry Problems and Solutions  
 Though the heuristics, biases, risk aversion, framing, and overconfidence issues of 
angel investors can influence their decisions, problems associated with information 
asymmetry can also influence their decisions.  Asymmetric information exists where 
parties possess different information about a transaction.  This can be harmful because 
one party can take advantage of another party’s lack of knowledge (Akerlof, 1970).  
Work by Leland and Pyle (1977), Grossman and Hart (1983) and Myers and Majluf 
(1984) suggests that information asymmetry can have profound effects on investment 
decisions.  Information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and investors is often higher in 
start-up companies than in other companies (Davila, Foster & Gupta, 2003; DiGregorio 
& Shane; 2003; Sanyal &Mann, 2010). 
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 Information asymmetry problems. 
 A potential outcome of asymmetric information is that the uninformed party will 
not trade with the informed party.  Another possibility is that good assets can only be sold 
at discounts, sometimes known as the “lemon problem” (Akerlof, 1970).  In the case of 
angel investors, entrepreneurs often have more knowledge of their company than angel 
investors (Ibrahim, 2008).  This could lead to such outcomes as experiencing poor returns 
for the angel, not investing in a project with potentially good returns, or pricing the 
investment too low as if it were a “lemon” (Ibrahim, 2008). 
Akerlof (1970), using a car example, describes a situation where information is 
limited or unknown.  Because buyers are unable to distinguish between good and bad 
cars (the lemon), they rate both good and bad deals as average.  Healy and Palepu (2001) 
describe a “lemon” problem that arises from information differences in a situation where 
half the business ideas are bad and half are good.  Investors and entrepreneurs value deals 
using their own information (Leland & Pyle, 1977; Smith, Smith & Bliss, 2011). 
Therefore, if the “lemon” problem is not resolved, they will overvalue the bad deals and 
undervalue the good deals relative to the information available to them.  
 There are generally two manifestations of asymmetric information problems, 
adverse selection and moral hazard.  Adverse selection occurs when parties have 
asymmetric information about the quality of an offering, thus causing a less than 
desirable offering to be selected (Clarke & Shastri, 2000).   
 Information asymmetry can also lead to moral hazard problems.  Moral hazard 
occurs when the behavioral intent or actions of a party result in detriment to others, and 
this action is different from what it would have been if all parties were fully exposed to 
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the risk.  It is a situation where a party takes a risk because the burden of taking that risk 
will not be fully felt by the party taking the risk (Hölmstrom, 1979). The party that 
commits the moral hazard has more information about the actions or intentions than the 
party paying for the consequences.  Because angels are investing their money at a very 
high risk time and the entrepreneur’s business decisions may affect the angel investors 
more than the entrepreneur, efforts should be taken to reduce effects of moral hazard.   
The record of accomplishments for new start-ups seeking early-stage capital is 
often limited by their brief time in business; as such, information asymmetry for 
individuals considering an investment is high (Amit, Glosten, & Muller, 1990; Van 
Osnabrugge & Robinson, 2000; Sørheim & Landstrom, 2001).  Though high levels of 
information asymmetry exist, angels continue to invest in start-ups (Becker-Blease & 
Sohl, 2007).  Problems associated with information asymmetry in angel investments are 
well documented (e.g. Dennis, 2004; Morrissette, 2007; Van Osnabrugge & Robinson, 
2000; Wiltbank, 2005). 
 Smith and Watts (1992) provide an example of problems associated with 
information asymmetry by suggesting that managers of high-growth firms have superior 
knowledge about the firm’s investment opportunity, as well as better knowledge of the 
expected future cash flows from their existing assets.  Therefore, angel investors must 
assess top management and their experience in order to reduce information asymmetry 
and the associated adverse selection and moral hazard problems.  For example, 
Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven (1990) empirically relate characteristics of the founding top-
management team, strategy and environment to sales growth in newly founded firms in 
the semiconductor industry.  Beckman, Burton and O’Reilly (2007) find that prior top 
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management team experience positively influences the rate of receiving venture capital 
funds and going public.  Additionally, top management teams with diverse backgrounds 
and experience will be able to reach entrepreneurial milestones more quickly than less 
experienced teams.  In summary, the prior experience, prior company affiliations and 
functional experience of the top management team are important correlates of success.  
Firms with experienced team members from a range of experience will be successful 
more quickly than other firms (Beckman, Burton & O’Reilly, 2007; Burton, Sørensen & 
Beckman, 2002; Chandler & Hanks, 1998; Schefczyk & Gerpott, 2001), thus suggesting 
that reducing the information asymmetry surrounding the top management team would 
help prevent adverse selection problems with the investment.  
  Due diligence. 
 Due diligence is defined as gathering information on the potential investment; it 
often involves verifying facts, background checks, size of the targeted market, growth 
potential, cash flow projections, and asset valuation (DeGennaro, 2011).  The impact of 
investing in risky projects has been examined and it has been determined that rational 
investors will take steps to reduce the risk in their portfolio (Lintner, 1965; Miller, 2012). 
Key purposes of due diligence are to reduce information asymmetry, ascertain whether a 
project is suitable for funding, and improve the likelihood of positive returns (Allen & 
Santomero, 1997; DeGennaro, 2011; Dixon, 1991; Fiet, 1995b).   
 While risk aversion describes the investor who, while exposed to uncertainty in 
investments with similar expected returns, attempts to reduce the uncertainty (Pratt, 
1964), time spent on due diligence (i.e., deeper investigation into the person, business, 
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and/or industry being invested in) has been shown to be positively related to reducing 
information asymmetry and improving angel returns (Wiltbank & Boeker, 2007b).  
Although prior research determines that due diligence by angel investors is significant, 
that research does not explain why angel investors’ time spent on due diligence varies 
significantly.  This dissertation examines angel characteristics and deal characteristics in 
an effort to determine the influences that affect the amount of time an investor devotes to 
due diligence, as well as the factors that influence the percentage of wealth an angel 
invests in a project and the amount of time an angel spends on post-investment 
interaction with the firm.  
Screening is a due diligence process for combating adverse selection under 
information asymmetry (Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993; Smith, 1987; Ibrahim, 2008). 
Investment screening typically involves an investor’s examining the attractiveness of an 
opportunity.  Initial screening usually involves two elements: an initial examination of 
whether a proposal meets the angel’s personal investment criteria followed by a detailed 
investigation, or due diligence (Mason & Harrison, 2003).  Investment criteria might be 
knowledge of the industry sector,  interest in the sector, amount of funding sought, 
location, stage of development or perhaps “gut feel” (Mason & Harrison, 2003). Screens 
are designed to identify characteristics and behaviors in the entrepreneur to determine 
“fit” with the angel’s criteria.  For example, if the entrepreneur’s values, management 
team, and strategy do not align with the angel’s and are identified during the screening 
process, then the project might not move forward.  This may involve an examination of 
market size, strategy, technology, competition, management team, and contract terms 
(Kaplan & Stromberg, 2001; Stuart, & Abetti, 1990).  The opportunity may also be 
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examined in terms of location, kind of business, requisite amount of money, and other 
business criteria.  The aim of this early stage is to assess whether to justify the investment 
of time for the additional due diligence.  Riding, Dal Cin, Duxbury, Haines, and Safrata 
(1993) find that 72.6% of opportunities were rejected in the initial screening stage, but 
only 15.9% were rejected after the more detailed due diligence.  As due diligence 
progressed, though, another 6.3% were eliminated, for a cumulative rejection rate of 
94.8%.   
 Due diligence helps to reduce information asymmetries and decreases potential 
risk in angel investing.  However, research suggests that an angel investor’s time spent on 
due diligence is not correlated with the size of the initial investment and does not increase 
with additional investment.  However, time spent on due diligence does increase with the 
percentage of wealth invested (DeGennaro & Dwyer, 2013; Mitteness, Baucus & Sudek, 
2012; Smith, Harrison & Mason, 2010; Wiltbank & Boeker, 2007b).  Low levels of due 
diligence on risky projects are in direct contrast to the principles of traditional finance.  
Previous psychological and finance research, though, indicates that behavioral variables 
can help explain departures from rational behavior under conditions of risk (Ritter, 2003; 
Statman, 1999).    
As the number of hours angels spend on due diligence varies considerably, it is 
important to understand reasons for differing amounts of time that an angel investor 
expends on due diligence and factors that affect those decisions.  Though time spent on 
due diligence improves angel investor returns, Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000) 
find that angel due diligence is less detailed and results in lower returns than similar 
investments, such as venture capital.  Van Osnabrugge and Robinson find that angel due 
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diligence typically entailed collection of fewer independent references about an 
entrepreneur than venture capitalists (0.96 versus 4.2 references), and angels experienced 
lower returns (32 percent for angels versus 90 percent for venture capitalists).    
 Staged financing. 
 Prior studies have examined the role of the stage of an investment, as well as co-
investing and post-investment participation (interaction) on investment returns to angel 
investors (Wiltbank, 2005).  That analysis finds that post-investment participation by 
angel investors reduces information asymmetry.  It also suggests that co-investors reduce 
the necessity to invest time in due diligence.   
  Angels prefer to provide financing to companies at various stages of their growth 
versus all at once (Wong, Bhatia, & Freeman, 2009).  Staged financing provides several 
benefits, including reduced risk and increased control.  Staged financing is thought to 
work so well that Gompers and Lerner (2001) describe it as “the most potent control 
mechanism a venture capitalist can employ.”  Angel investors often invest in the earlier  
stages of a firm as compared to other investors, including venture capitalists (Wong, 
Bhatia & Freeman, 2009).  However, angels are not as reliant on the traditional forms of 
control such as contracts and board control (Wong, Bhatia & Freeman, 2009).  More 
often, they reduce the agency costs by forcing the entrepreneur to hold a higher stake in 
the firm.  The higher stakes held by the entrepreneur tends to align the interest of the 
entrepreneur with that of the angel investors while also reducing agency costs (Wong, 
Bhatia, & Freeman, 2009).  
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 The sequential stage developmental process for new business has been studied 
extensively (Lewis & Churchill, 1983; Greiner, 1972; Kimberly & Miles, 1980; Ruhnka 
& Young, 1987).  Ruhnka & Young (1987) analyzed the perceptions of 73 U.S. venture 
capital firms about key features of the stage development process for new business 
ventures.  These stages are central to most “stages of development” theories and are 
arguably of critical importance in the growth, survival, and financial success of new 
ventures (Ruhnka & Young, 1987).  The stages of development of a firm that angels 
invest in have different levels of information asymmetry and different levels of risk 
(Bruno & Tyebjee, 1986; Cooper, 1981; Gaibraith, 1982; Pratt & Bokser, 1998; Ruhnka 
& Young, 1987).  The stages of firm development that an angel invests in are seed stage, 
start-up, early growth, late growth, and the turnaround stage. 
 The seed stage is considered the stage where a person or company approaches the 
angel investor for funding for an idea or product.  There may or may not be a prototype 
product that has been fully developed or tested at this stage. There has usually not been 
any income generated by the firm at this stage.  At the seed stage, a relatively small 
amount of money is needed to prove a concept or develop a product.  The start-up stage 
begins after the seed stage.  At this point an economic feasibility analysis of the idea or 
product has been completed by angel investors and a business plan has been presented to 
the angel investor.  A fully developed prototype of the product will be built and tested 
during this phase.  Market research is completed to determine if the market is large 
enough to support the idea.  The start-up stage describes companies in business for less 
than one year and whose product has not been commercially marketed.  Next, at the early 
growth stage, the idea or product is being produced and sold on the market.  The 
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company is trying to gain market share and achieve break-even on the expenses and the 
investment.  The growth is guided by the natural growth of the market; however, tasks 
are being aimed at making the firm more profitable through modifying the product and 
often second-generation products are beginning to appear (Gaibraith, 1982).  During the 
late growth, or maturity, stage the company is trying to expand the company and the 
market share.  Follow-up products are being introduced into the market and the company 
is trying to expand the life-cycle of existing products.  Ruhnka & Young (1987) present 
data that suggests that characteristics for companies in this late growth stage generally 
include companies that have seasoned management, have been in business for five or 
more years, have an established product, breakeven or profitable financials, and 
increasing sales.  A turnaround stage involves a company that is generally in financial 
trouble and involves a process of recovery and investment to stabilize the situation, 
address management issues and implement emergency actions that create value to return 
to profitability (Bruno & Tyebjee, 1986; Pratt & Bokser, 1998; Ruhnka & Young, 1987). 
The firm in this turnaround stage generally has higher competitive risks and is having 
difficulty increasing sales or market share.  These companies may also show signs of 
being undercut in the market by unanticipated competitors, which may result in a closed 
“window” of opportunities for capital investors to offer an initial public offering or 
otherwise cash out their investment.  This stage often requires repositioning the product 
or keeping the investee alive until a liquidation or merger can be achieved (Ruhnka & 
Young, 1987).  
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 Angel investors tend to invest in ventures at the earlier stages of investment (seed 
and startup stage) when the information asymmetry tends to inhibit the securing of 
financing through other sources (Mason & Harrison, 1995; Prowse, 1998; Wetzel, 1983). 
Syndication   
Syndication occurs when two or more investors, such as angel investors or 
venture capitalists, share in the financing of a venture (Lerner, 1994).  As of 2007, 
approximately 10,000 accredited angel investors belong to 265 angel groups, thus 
providing evidence of angel investors’ desire to invest alongside other angels 
(www.angelcapitaleducation.org).  Angel investors sometimes organize into angel groups 
to share research, pool their investment capital, and reduce risk (Aram, 1989; Markova & 
Perkovska-Mircevska, 2009; Sohl, 2012; Wong, Bhatia &Freeman, 2009).  Research 
suggests that typically at least two or three angels invest in each deal, with most angel 
investors preferring to invest with other angels (Freear, Sohl & Wetzel, 1995; Gaston, 
1989; Van Osnabrugge & Robinson, 2000).  Given that angels desire to invest with other 
angels, and angels have capital available to invest, syndication provides additional 
growth opportunities for entrepreneurs. 
 Syndication attempts to formally organize angels and to create a more efficient 
angel market (i.e., known as “angel networks”).  These networks are typically operated 
by a not-for-profit, such as a university (Berger & Udell, 1998).  The networks provide 
angels opportunity to invest with other “qualified” angel investors.  Qualified investors 
are those investors who meet the Securities and Exchange Commission accredited 
investor standards, which include a net worth of at least $1 million and an annual income 
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of $200,000 for the previous three years or a combined income with their spouse of 
$300,000 (U.S. SEC, 2012).  
 Analysis of angel investor practices of investing alone or with others has been 
difficult, due to lack of large data sets (Bammens, & Collewaert, 2012; Fenn & Liang, 
1998).  Goldfarb, Hoberg, Kirsch, and Triantis (2009) analyze 182 venture financing 
deals including only 32 angel investors to examine syndication of deals with angels 
alone, angels with venture capitalists, and venture capitalists alone.  Their study finds that 
angels who invest alone are slower to liquidate, thus suggesting that angel investors may 
have enhanced patience or possibly weaker control rights.  The study also shows that 
angels frequently invest alongside venture capitalists, purchase the same stocks, and 
experience similar returns. 
 Angels are presented with many opportunities to invest over the course of a year.  
Angels often invest with other angels in groups.  Psychoanalytic theory is useful in 
understanding  syndication.  Some angel members define their tasks, are clear about their 
purpose, and work together with other members in an investment.  Other members may 
not think for themselves but engage in groupthink.  Groupthink provides good feelings 
and comfort to group members through unconscious defenses adopted by the members 
rather than creative, reality-based thinking and functioning (Janis, 1982).  In this 
scenario, a divided state of mind takes over from reality-based thinking, and information 
is evaluated to promote the good feelings and excitement while the negative feelings are 
split off from the awareness.  This can result in ideas where investors become caught up 
in the good feelings and excitement, or unconscious wishful thinking, and split off or 
deny the underlying risk.  Shiller (2005, p.159) describes this paradox as “completely 
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rational people” becoming caught up and producing “behavior that is, in a well-defined 
sense, irrational.”  An example would be two previously successful angel investors 
agreeing to invest in a project and other angel investors joining the project because of the 
excitement, perhaps without performing due diligence.  Groupthink falls under the 
category of emotions in behavioral finance and draws on how people’s emotions and 
feelings help drive all investment activity.  Groupthink leads to homogenous behavior.  
Even the homogenous  behavior may be caused by cognitive error, the more homogenous 
the behavior of irrational investors, the larger the effect on the investment.  This 
groupthink can be referred to as herding - and herding based on cognitive error can steer 
the investment away from its fundamental value. 
 Although much heterogeneity exists between angels and venture capitalists 
investing together, the angel-only deals fail the least often (Goldfarb, Hoberg, Kirsch, and 
Triantis, 2009). Other studies argue that venture capitalists who network together through 
syndication increase their performance, as measured by better exit rates (Hochberg, 
Ljungqvist & Lu, 2007).  Syndication, staged financing, and convertible securities are 
seen as solutions to information asymmetry problems between entrepreneurs and 
uninformed investors (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011). 
 Angel investors often use syndication to reduce individual angel risk by spreading 
risk over several investors versus taking on all the risk themselves (Wong, Bhatia & 
Freeman, 2009).  There are other reasons that angels invest together.  For example, some 
angel investors invest for reasons other than ROI, such as they enjoy lending their 
expertise to other angels and to entrepreneurs seeking angel investments (Sudek, 2006).  
Evidence supporting the non-financial investment reasons suggests that due diligence 
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decisions are affected by group structure that allows “experts” to evaluate, monitor, and 
vouch for deals in their area of expertise while others can invest for their own reasons 
(DeGennaro, 2010; Mason & Harrison, 2008).  Experts who “champion” a deal tend to 
conduct better due diligence than they would to satisfy themselves in an effort to protect 
their reputation (Payne & Macarty, 2002).  Thus, a kind of free rider effect regarding time 
spent on due diligence can occur by other angel investors.  This dissertation proposes to 
enhance the prior qualitative approach with a quantitative analysis and incorporate 
additional data to test the reasons angels spend time on due diligence.  
Syndication can facilitate due diligence/monitoring and add value to an 
investment if investors are able to share their specific knowledge and complementary 
skills.  Syndication, however, can also hinder due diligence/monitoring because of the 
free-rider problem (Das & Teng, 2002; Dimov & Milanov, 2010; Wright & Lockett, 
2003; Wright & Robbie, 1998; Manigart, Lockett, Meuleman, Wright, Landström, 
Bruining, Desbrières & Hommel, 2006; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001).  The free-rider 
problem refers to parties who benefit without paying for the cost of the benefit.   
The free-rider problem associated with angels in groups might include angels who 
participate in time spent on due diligence/monitoring and other angels who benefit from 
their efforts.  Das and Teng (2002) argue that a social exchange of controls mitigates the 
free-rider problem when three or more parties are involved.  Because the exchange of 
information entails reciprocity, accountability is relatively high and the free-rider 
problem is easy to detect.  The social exchange theory also suggests a high need for trust 
and a deep sense of solidarity over time.  When free-riding is detected, both social 
sanctions and a cooperative culture can be utilized to remedy the problem.  Cooperative 
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culture is reciprocity of benefits, while social sanctions reduce free-riding by damaging 
the reputation of the member involved (Das and Teng, 2002).  This process of social 
sanctions and cooperative culture typically results in all individual investors contributing 
to the success of the investment through their individual strengths (Das and Teng, 2002).   
 The information asymmetry problems in angel investing are numerous and 
complex, so research into solutions to reduce the information asymmetry has included 
increased angel investor due diligence, monitoring of the investment, staged investments 
of funds into the firm, and syndication of other angels into the investment.  Each of these 
solutions has provided evidence to suggest increased investment return.  The 
combinations of these solutions as they relate to other angel behavioral factors should 
lead to further enhancements in the behavioral finance literature regarding individual 
investors that do not use professional portfolio advisors and angel investors in particular.  
Theory Development and Hypotheses 
 This dissertation examines the factors that influence angel investors’ amount of 
time spent on due diligence, the percentage of wealth invested in a project, and the 
amount of post-investment interaction between the angel investor and the firm, the three 
dependent variables.  The choice of the independent variables follows the prior literature, 
which suggests that demographic factors, experience and risk tolerance shape these 
decisions.     
 Understanding the behavioral bias and heuristic influences that affect the framing 
of investment choices of angel investors, including time spent on due diligence, the 
amount of wealth invested in a project, and post-investment interaction, may provide 
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implications for stock selections, asset valuation and performance based management 
contracts.  
Dependent variables. 
Time spent on due diligence. 
 Time spent on due diligence (i.e., deeper investigation into the person, business, 
and/or industry being invested in) has been shown to reduce information asymmetry and 
improve angel returns (Wiltbank & Boeker, 2007b).  Angel investments are considered 
high risk projects that contain high information asymmetry.  Information asymmetry 
exists in many areas of the investment, including the top management team (TMT), stage 
of the investment, the number of co-investors that will invest and the past experience of 
the co-investors, and the source of the investment.  Past research has used a variety of 
factors to evaluate opportunities and risk tolerance of angel investors (Haines, Madill & 
Riding, 2003; Mason & Stark, 2004).  Risk tolerance includes examination of the 
entrepreneur’s management team and its prior experience/track record (Haines, Madill & 
Riding, 2003; Mason & Stark, 2004).  The competence and experience of the top 
management team can assist in overcoming market challenges that arise.  Van 
Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000) find that although angels emphasize the importance of 
the management team, angels are less deterred by gaps in the management team because 
angels can contribute to management expertise through personal involvement with the 
investment.  However, time spent on due diligence might lead to reducing information 
asymmetry in many of these areas and improved angel returns.  Other than returns, the 
factors that drive time spent on due diligence have not previously been examined.  It is 
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unknown whether angel investors are influenced by behavioral factors that might 
influence their time spent on due diligence.  This leads to the first testable hypothesis, 
stated in the null form: 
Hypothesis 1 – There is no relationship between angel investor behavioral factors 
and time spent on due diligence. 
 Percent of wealth invested. 
Investors are assumed to be rational and concepts of risk aversion have been 
developed to describe their behavior (Arrow, 1971; Pratt, 1964).  Risk aversion of an 
investor describes the tendency of the investor to reduce the uncertainty while choosing 
among risky investments with similar expected returns (Pratt, 1964).  Studies that 
examine the percentage of wealth placed in risky assets find that risk aversion is a 
decreasing function of the proportion of total assets.  For instance, an investor whose 
utility for total assets is unchanging and whose assets are increasing would be willing to 
pay less for insurance as his risk aversion for a risky asset has decreased as his wealth 
increased (Arrow, 1971; Pratt, 1964).  Prior studies, such as Cohn, Lewellen, Lease, and 
Schlarbaum (1975), have investigated the effects of the percentage of wealth invested on 
allocation of individual portfolios to risky assets.   The percentage of wealth invested is a 
proxy for angel investor risk tolerance.  Most angels are considered to be wealthy.  An 
examination of the behavioral influences on the percentage of wealth invested may help 
explain angel investor decisions.  
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 The same predictors included in Hypothesis 1 are included in Hypothesis 2, which 
consist of demographic measures, measures associated with experience, and measures 
associated with risk tolerance. The second testable hypothesis, stated in the null form is: 
Hypothesis 2: There is no relationship between angel investor behavioral factors 
and the percent of wealth invested. 
 Since many early stage entrepreneurs may have little business experience, 
different contractual relationships between angel investors and entrepreneurs are required 
to deal with agency problems and information asymmetry, and to create additional value 
(Keuschnigg & Nielson, 2003).  Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) present a useful guide 
describing post-investment activities for venture capital (VC) investors.  Although there 
are differences between VC and angel investors, the guide is still useful in describing 
post-investment activities.  The authors list post-investment activities as sitting on the 
board, orchestrating mergers and acquisitions, recruiting key executives or managers, 
acting as a sounding board to the CEO, evaluation of the top management team, working 
on strategy development, and providing guidance and business contacts.  The investor 
interaction activities can be separated into monitoring activities and value adding 
activities.   
 Monitoring is observing and supervising activities to ensure they are on course to 
meet the objectives and targets.  Information asymmetry results in costly monitoring of 
firms (Diamond, 1984; Healy & Palepu, 2001).  Diamond (1984) recognizes that 
monitoring is critically important and that reducing costs in the investment is also 
important.  Prior studies on the determinants of internal rates of return in venture capital 
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and private equity investments have found that the more advice and monitoring provided 
contribute to a significant increase of the internal rate of return realized (Cumming and 
Walz, 2009).   
 Gompers (1995) finds that the information asymmetry in new startups makes 
monitoring and governance extremely important.  His evidence further suggests that the 
staging of capital infusions provides opportunities to gather information and monitor the 
progress of the firm.  This monitoring may lead to further investments, or abandoning a 
project.  The shorter the duration between rounds of financing, the more frequent the 
monitoring of the project.  While the duration of a round of financing is one method of 
monitoring, the total amount provided and the number of rounds are also important in 
staged investments (Gompers, 1995). 
 While monitoring protects the interest of the angel investor, value adding activities, 
such as a sounding board, business advisor, professional consultant, mentor, confidant, 
manager recruitment and supplier and customer recruitment, also require an investment in 
time  (Sapienza, Manigart, & Vermeir, 1996).  Research suggests that post-investment 
interaction is value adding (Chua & Wu, 2009).  Since post-investment interaction is 
valuable to the entrepreneur and the angel investor, the implications of behavioral 
influences on interaction decisions are explored. 
 The same predictors included in Hypothesis 1 and 2 are included in Hypothesis 3, 
which consist of demographic measures, measures associated with experience, and 
measures associated with risk tolerance.  The third testable hypothesis, stated in the null 
form is: 
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Hypothesis 3: There is no relationship between angel investor behavioral factors 
and interaction.   
Independent Variables. 
Demographics. 
To better understand investors’ decisions, demographics such as age, gender, 
education, and experience have been included in prior financial research (Becker-Blease 
& Sohl, 2011; Dwyer, Gilkeson & List, 2002; Fünfgeld & Wang, 2009; Harrison & 
Mason, 2007).  These demographic characteristics may influence angel investor 
decisions.  Early extensive research finds that most angel investors are middle-aged, 
wealthy males with college degrees, and later works confirm that the profile still holds 
(Gaston, 1989; Freear, Sohl & Wetzel, 1995; Maula, Autio & Arenius, 2005; Morrissette, 
2007; Stedler & Peters, 2003).  
 Economic researchers examining factors that influence risky investments have 
found that age, wealth, education, and risk perception are predictors of investor decisions 
(Guiso, Haliassos, & Jappelli, 2002; Perraudin & Sorensen, 2000).  Age, gender and 
education level are typical demographic considerations in the literature.  Age has been 
determined to affect people’s attitudes and behavior (Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, 
Schupp, & Wagner, 2011).  As investors age, they become more cautious, seek greater 
certainty, and are more reluctant to adopt new technologies (Akhter, 2003; Botwinick, 
1973; Gilly & Zeithaml, 1985).  The influence of age and experience on angel investors’ 
behavioral decisions to spend time on due diligence are examined. 
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 Gender differences in attitudes and behavior have been extensively studied in the 
psychology and investment literatures (Croson, & Gneezy, 2009; Powell & Ansic, 1997; 
Schubert, Brown, Gysler & Brachinger, 1999; Weber, Blaise & Betz, 2002).  Studies 
report that men engage in more risk-taking than women (Hinz, McCarthy & Turner, 
1997; Sunden & Surette, 1998).  Additionally, men tend to display more overconfidence 
and rely more on themselves than others in their decisions (Barber & Odean, 2001; 
Lewellen, Lease & Schlarbaum, 1977; Lundeberg, Fox & Punćcohaŕ, 1994).  Prior 
studies suggest that angel investors are 84-97% male (Gaston, 1989; Freear, Sohl & 
Wetzel, 1995). The informal venture capital market does not appear as a gender 
differentiated market; however, some researchers have suggested that sufficient gender-
based issues, such as gender-based perceptions of risk and possible female support for 
female entrepreneurs, exists.  Therefore, gender should be included in the analysis of 
angel investor decisions (Harrison & Mason, 2007; Olsen & Cox, 2001).   
 The education of angel investors falls into the demographic analysis.  Several 
studies have found that angel investors are highly educated, with Aram (1989) finding 
that 82% of informal investors in the US have at least undergraduate degrees and 28-42% 
have graduate degrees (Aram, 1989; Gaston, 1989; Van Osnabrugge & Robinson, 2000).  
This is consistent with the theory of planned behavior that suggests a high level of 
education is likely to be positively associated with perceived behavioral control and with 
beliefs in one’s own capability to make successful investments (Ajzen, 1985).  
Additionally, household portfolio theory also predicts a positive relationship between 
level of education and successful household investments in risky assets (Guiso, Haliassos 
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& Jappelli, 2002).  Thus, demographic influences such as age, gender, and education may 
be factors that influence investors in risky projects and are examined by this research. 
Experience. 
 The level of investing experience can affect investor returns and decisions.  
Studies examining previous investing experience of angels in other angel investments 
conclude that angels have varying levels of investment experience, with most studies 
revealing that angels, on average, invest in one deal every two years (Freear & Wetzel, 
1991; Sullivan, 1991).  Furthermore, recent successes/failures in investing can influence 
individuals’ investment decisions.  The psychology literature on systematic errors in the 
way people think indicates that people place too much emphasis on their recent 
experiences (Ritter, 2003).   
 In order for angel investors to continue investing, they have to have been 
reasonably successful.  Many angels have achieved success as an entrepreneur (Van 
Osnabrugge, 2000).  Success as an entrepreneur in building their own new ventures can 
lead to experience that adds value to the new ventures in which they invest.  The number 
of years that the angel investor has been an entrepreneur is an angel investor experience 
factor in this analysis. 
 Angel investors who have prior experience in founding firms likely have more 
experience in firm valuation (Hsu, 2007).  Prior experience in valuation can remove some 
information asymmetry and assist with successful deal construction.  Additionally, those 
with more successful prior funding experience exhibit a track record that infers, or 
signals, quality of their experience and may lead to additional deals (Spence, 1973). The 
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number of firms previously founded by the angel investor is another angel experience 
variable. 
 The total number of exits an angel has experienced is examined as a component of 
experience.  There are several ways that an angel investor can exit an investment.  The 
exit can come from a shareholder buy back, through the sale of the company, or through 
an initial public stock offering (IPO).  These successful exits generally require the 
company to be developed over a period of years.  Unsuccessful exits would include those 
where a company was closed.   The total number of exits an angel has experienced may 
signal prior success in angel investments which could influence investing decisions 
through primacy and recency effects. 
 To examine whether individual experience attributes are related to angel investing 
decisions, this dissertation examines these factors: years an angel investor has spent 
investing, years that an angel has been an entrepreneur, the number of firms an angel has 
founded, the number of previous investments an angel investor has made, and the number 
of previous exits that an angel has experienced as the components of experience. 
 Top-management-team experience. 
 Since the quality of the top management team (TMT) is associated with positive 
outcomes of the firm, angel assessment of top management prior experiences and 
backgrounds is essential to reducing information asymmetry and the related adverse 
selection problems.  Seven questions that reveal information on the background and prior 
experience of the top management team are utilized:   
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• Has the top management founded and led other ventures; has the top management 
been successful in other ventures? 
• Does the top management have significant large firm experience? 
• Does the top management have significant technical expertise? 
• Does the top management have significant management expertise? 
• Does the top management have significant sales and marketing expertise? 
• Does the angel not know about the details of the top management of the 
investment?  
 There is a natural linkage between TMT and firm performance (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). In addition to evaluating the TMT experience, angels must consider 
whether or not the TMT is one of the top three strategic challenges the business faces. 
Angels may determine that they may be able to assist in choosing or training the TMT 
members.  Williamson (2000) suggests that new venture entrepreneurs seek advice from 
those nearest to them. Thus, it is possible that the TMT has limited experience; however, 
angels may believe that this may or may not hinder the investment.  Whether or not 
management risk is considered to be a strategic risk of the investment is considered in 
this analysis. 
 Stage of the investment. 
 Angel investments are considered high-risk and often result in a wide array of 
investment returns (Van Osnabrugge, 2000; Wong, Bhatia & Freeman, 2009). Such 
returns can range from total losses of an investment to yields of 50% or more 
(Collewaert, 2012; Mason & Harrison, 2002; Preston, 2011).  The perception of risk 
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varies across stages of the firm’s development.  Ruhnka & Young (1987) provide 
empirical evidence that the perceived risk of loss is highest in the seed stage and 
decreases in later stages.  The decrease in the estimated risk of loss in succeeding stages 
of development should influence angel investor behavior towards the amount of money 
invested and time spent on due diligence.   
 Since angel investors tend to invest in ventures at the seed and startup stage 
(Mason & Harrison, 1995; Prowse, 1998; Wetzel, 1983), this dissertation examines the 
impact of seed and start-up stage and their influence on decisions to spend time on due 
diligence and the percentage of the angel investor’s wealth invested in a project.  
 Syndication. 
 Angel investors use syndication, or the co-investing with other angel investors, to 
reduce individual angel risk by spreading risk over several investors versus taking on all 
the risk themselves (Wong, Bhatia & Freeman, 2009).  This analysis uses the number of 
other investors that joined in the investment at the time the angel investor invested to 
determine if syndication influences the decision to spend time on due diligence and the 
percentage of the angel investor’s wealth invested in a project.  
 Source of the deal. 
 Angel investors learn about potential investments through a variety of sources, 
such as previous friendship with the entrepreneur, referrals from friends, group 
screenings, and group presentations.  A trust bias may be reflected in due diligence and 
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percent of wealth decisions.  Other biases, such as herding, may be reflected in decisions 
regarding investments resulting from group screenings.   
 The initial screening stage filters out the majority of the proposals that angels 
receive (Mason & Harrison, 2003). Angels may receive written investment proposals, 
such as an executive summary of a business plan from an entrepreneur, another angel 
group, or a formal intermediary.  During the initial screening, deals are considered for 
“fit”, or whether the deal meets the investor’s criteria, such as interest, stage of 
development, amount of funding sought, and location (Mason & Rogers, 1997).  The 
screening process may occur over a relatively short time, sometimes less than ten 
minutes, and will be subject to due diligence later (Hall & Hofer, 1993; Mason & Rogers, 
1997).  The initial screening can be important because the majority of deals are rejected 
at this stage (Feeney, Haines, & Riding, 1999). 
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CHAPTER 3 – METHODOLOGY 
 This dissertation utilizes data from the Angel Investor Performance Project 
(AIPP), the largest data set on accredited angel investors available.  It consists of 
responses from 86 investor groups with 539 investors who made 3097 investments from 
1972 through 2007.  The Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation and the Angel Capital 
Education Foundation with Willamette University and the University of Washington 
initiated the research to gather the data, which was collected by Wiltbank & Boeker 
(2007).  The survey is comprised of 83 questions and was designed to be completed in 
between 5 and 20 minutes (see Appendix A).  Respondents were offered the opportunity 
to receive a notification of the aggregated statistics that were compiled from the results of 
the survey as well as a free copy of The Entrepreneurial Initiative, a book by the 
president and CEO of the Kauffman Foundation, Carl Schramm.  
 Though many researchers do not distinguish between angel investors and angel 
groups (DeGennaro & Dwyer, 2013), an important trend is emergence of angel investor 
groups (Wiltbank & Boeker, 2007b).  Angel investor groups are comprised of angels who 
work together to consider investments, offer opinions and expertise, and join forces with 
their capital.  Angel investors invested an estimated $26 billion in entrepreneurial 
business in the United States in 2007, yet little is known about the individuals who play a 
crucial role in start-up capital (Angel Capital Education Foundation, 2013).  Research on 
angel investors and angel groups has been limited due to the fact that suitably large 
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data sets have not been available (DeGennaro & Dwyer, 2013). For example, some 
studies, such as Goldfarb, Hoberg, Kirsch and Triantis (2009), utilize as few as 32 angel-
only investments.  The Kauffman Foundation’s Angel Investor Performance Project on 
angel investments comprises data from 588 investments.  
 The angel investor survey was sent to 276 angel investor groups, asking their 
members to respond confidentially to an online questionnaire.  Eighty-six groups 
participated in the survey and of those eighty-six groups, thirteen percent of members 
(539 angel investors) responded.  Wiltbank & Boeker (2007) address the possible non-
response problems with the survey data and provide evidence that the AIPP data are 
relatively free of these types of problems.  They also address the problem of relatively 
low response rates by comparing within-groups returns and determine that the 
distribution is similar in high response rate groups to those with low response rates, thus 
providing little evidence of correlation of returns with reporting frequency.  
 Initially, a series of descriptive statistics are reported to describe the variables of 
interest as well as this sample of investors.  These descriptive statistics consist of 
frequency tables for categorical variables and measures of central tendency, including the 
mean, and measures of variability for continuous measures. 
Normalizing Variables 
Examining data prior to analysis to test for outliers, normality and shape of the 
distribution is necessary to understand and interpret the results (Hair, Black, Babin 
&Anderson, 2010, p.77).  Outliers are common in data and can have a substantial effect 
on the results.  To detect and modify extreme observations, Winsorizing provides the 
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benefit of setting all outliers to a specified percentile of the data while retaining the 
ordering of the data and providing more robust estimators.  For example, a 90% 
Winsorization would typically set all values above the 95th percentile of a variable to the 
95th percentile and all values below the 5th percentile of the variable to the 5th percentile.  
Winsorizing involves the calculation of the mean after replacing given parts of a 
probability distribution or sample at the high and low end with the most extreme 
remaining values, typically doing so for an equal amount of both extremes. 
Steps are taken in order to normalize the three continuous dependent variables 
used in these analyses (time spent on due diligence, percentage of wealth invested, and 
amount of post-investment interaction).  All of these variables are first Winsorized to 
help produce a greater level of normality, which is an assumption of many of the tests 
conducted.  Winsorization often replaces 10 to 25 percent of the ends (Tukey, 1977); 
however, in the AIPP data, due to very few extreme outliers, only 2.5 percent of the ends 
are replaced in the Winsorization.  By Winsorizing the number of hours of due diligence, 
a reasonable estimate of central tendency is determined by excluding the one angel 
investor with 5,000 hours of reported due diligence.  Although Winsorization of the 
number of hours of due diligence is useful, the percent of wealth and amount of post-
investment interaction is not impacted much with Winsorization; thus their Winsorized 
versions were not utilized.   
Missing data are a part of almost all research.  There are several reasons data may 
be missing.  They may be missing because data were entered incorrectly, equipment 
malfunctioned, or the respondent did not want to answer.  For example, this dataset 
contains the year of birth, which is used for determining the age of the respondent at the 
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time of the investment.  In one case, a zero was entered; therefore, it was recoded as 
missing.  One respondent entered date of birth as “69,” which was recoded as 1969.  One 
respondent listed 2005 as birth year.  Because this is not logical, it was recoded as 
missing.  On respondent level of education, the choices are 1=Bachelor’s, 2=Master’s, 
3=JD, and 4=Ph.D.  After consulting with Rob Wiltbanks, the author of the survey, it was 
determined that no angels selected the option for high school, which was also available. 
Listwise deletion was utilized as the treatment for missing data. 
Analysis 
 Hypothesis 1. 
 Poisson regression. 
 The first hypothesis focused upon the impact of demographics, experience, and 
risk tolerance on the time spent on due diligence.  The demographic factors include age, 
gender, and education level.  The  measures of investor experience consist of years spent 
investing, years as an entrepreneur, number of firms founded, total number of previous 
investments, total number of previous exits, and years of work experience within the 
same industry as the investment.  The model also included as risk tolerance predictors the 
angel investor’s assessment of top management team (TMT) experience, whether the 
TMT is perceived as a strategic risk,  the stage of the venture, and the number of co-
investors, with number of hours spent on due diligence as the dependent variable.   
 Poisson regression was utilized in this analysis as it was beneficial in modeling 
count data with a Poisson distribution.  Given only the average rate of time spent on due 
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diligence for a certain investment and assuming the mix of processes was random, the 
Poisson distribution specifies how likely it was that the due diligence time would be 15, 
20, 25 or any other number of hours during one period of the observation.  The Poisson 
regression thereby predicts the degree of spread around a known average rate of time 
spent on due diligence.   
 When data are in the form of counts, researchers often utilize suboptimal 
strategies, such as rescaling into categories such as 0-10, 10-20, and more than 20.  
Gardner, Mulvey, and Shaw (1995) suggest that reducing counts to categories wastes 
information, may dilute statistical power, and might affect results by the choice of cut-off 
point for the categories.  The problems using linear regression with rate data is that the 
linear regression model has both the wrong model for the relationship between the 
predictors and the expected values of the counts and the relationship between the 
expected values and variances of the counts.  Linear regression could possibly lead to 
wrong inferences about the predictors (Aitchison, & Dunsmore, 1980, p.114; Gardner, 
Mulvey & Shaw, 1995).  
 Hypothesis 2. 
 Tobit regression. 
The second hypothesis focused upon whether a relationship exists between angel 
investor decision factors and the percent of wealth invested.  The same predictors were 
included in these analyses as in the previous model, which consist of demographic 
measures and measures for investor experience and risk tolerance.   
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The Tobit analysis assumes that the dependent variable has a number of its values 
clustered at some minimum value and provides a technique to utilize all observations 
(including those at the limit and above it) to estimate a regression line.  Other techniques 
estimate a line with the observations above the limit (Tobin, 1958). 
Logistic regression. 
A logistic regression was used to estimate the factors that influence the percent of 
wealth invested.  The logit model was useful since the dependent variable is categorical 
and there were multiple independent variables.  The logistic regression has the advantage 
when normality of variables is not met.  It is also useful in cases where the participation 
data are not continuous or distributed normally.  Thus, logistic regression does not face 
the strict assumptions and is more robust when the assumptions are not met (Hair, Black, 
Babin, & Anderson, 2010, p. 317-319).   
 Ordinary least squares (OLS). 
 Ordinary least squares (OLS) was utilized in analysis of the second hypothesis.  
The OLS estimation procedure provided a prediction of the dependent variable, percent 
of wealth invested, for each observation in the data.  The procedure set the regression 
weights to minimize residuals.  This allowed calculation of a single predicted value of the 
dependent variable regardless of the number of independent variables in the regression 
model. Thus, the predicted value represented the total of all effects of the regression and 
allowed the residuals to be used as a diagnostic measure for the overall regression model 
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(Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010, p. 198).  The benefit of the OLS regression result 
is in forecasting or predicting the percent of wealth to be invested in a project. 
 Hypothesis 3. 
 Poisson regression. 
 The third hypothesis focused upon the impact of demographics, experience, and 
risk tolerance on the amount of post-investment interaction between the angel and the 
venture.  The demographic factors include age, gender, and education level.  The  
measures of investor experience consist of years spent investing, years as an 
entrepreneur, number of firms founded, total number of previous investments, total 
number of previous exits, and years of work experience within the same industry as in the 
investment.  The model also included as risk tolerance predictors the angel investor’s 
assessment of top management team experience, whether the TMT was perceived as a 
strategic risk, the stage of the venture, and the number of co-investors, with the number 
of interactions per year as the dependent variable.   
 Tobit regression. 
The third hypothesis examined the relationship between angel investor decision 
factors and the amount of post-investment interaction an angel performed.  The same 
predictors were included in these analyses as in the previous models, which consisted of 
demographic measures and measures associated with investor experience risk tolerance.   
 
60 
 
 
 
 Ordinary least squares (OLS). 
 OLS regression was also used as a robustness test of the third hypothesis.  The 
OLS estimation procedure provided a prediction of the dependent variable, amount of 
interaction, for each observation in the data.  The OLS regression result was beneficial in 
forecasting or predicting the amount of interaction that will be performed in an 
investment. 
Summary 
The focus of this analysis was on angel investor decision factors that might 
influence angel investors to invest in projects, as well as factors that influence amount of 
time spent on due diligence and post-investment interaction.  The purpose of the present 
study was to better understand the role of behavioral finance influences and angel 
investors. The findings of this study may be generalizable to other investors who make 
decisions without the use of professional portfolio advisors.  Additionally, having a better 
understanding of angel investor decisions with relation to the amount of time spent on 
due diligence might provide insights into important factors that should be considered 
when assessing the effectiveness of pre-investment decision processes among angel 
investors.  Finally, further study into due diligence may offer additional insights into 
information asymmetry.  
   The data set utilized in this study consisted of responses from 86 investor groups 
with a total of 539 investors who made 3097 investments from 1972 through 2007.  A 
series of descriptive statistics are conducted initially.  The first hypothesis included in this 
study focused upon the relationship between angel investor decision factors and their due 
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diligence decisions.  A Poisson regression was estimated in order to test this hypothesis.  
This analysis included due diligence as the outcome measure and incorporated angel 
demographics, variables focusing on angel experience, variables focusing upon 
assessment of TMT experience, perceived TMT risk, stage of the investment, number of 
co-investors, and source of the deal as predictors.  The second hypothesis tested in this 
study focused upon the relationship between the foregoing angel investor behavioral 
factors and the percent of personal wealth an angel invested in a project.  A Tobit 
regression was estimated in order to explore this hypothesis.  Following this, logistic 
regression and a linear regression were conducted as robustness checks.  The third 
hypothesis focused on the amount of post-investment interaction between the angel 
investor and the firm and the above angel investor behavioral factors.  A Tobit regression 
was utilized in this estimation.  Logistic regression and an OLS regression were estimated 
as robustness tests.
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 CHAPTER 4 – RESULTS 
 
 This chapter presents the results of the study.  Because there are no legal reporting 
requirements for angel investors, insight into their decision-making process is sparse.  
This dissertation utilizes data from angel investors who are members of groups.  
Responses were received from 539 angel investors in eighty-six angel investor groups.  
Initially, a series of descriptive statistics were reported to provide a description of the 
data set as well as the individuals included in the study.  A series of regression analyses 
was performed focusing on the following outcomes: amount of time spent on due 
diligence, percentage of wealth invested, and respondent’s level of interaction with the 
company.  Additionally, correlations were estimated between the respondent’s level of 
interaction with the company and due diligence. 
 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 defines the variables utilized in the analyses.  Table 2 summarizes 
descriptive statistics of the continuous variables, including sample size, mean, standard 
deviation, minimum, and maximum.   
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for due diligence and percentage of wealth 
invested, with and without Winsorizing.  Winsorizing was particularly useful in 
analyzing the number of hours of due diligence because of outliers.  Of 277 angel 
investors responding to the due diligence question, the mean hours of due diligence is 
60.6 hours with a standard deviation of 317.7 hours.  However, one angel investor 
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reported 5,000 hours, and three reported 1,000 hours. These outliers influence the 
reported hours of due diligence.  Because the data distribution reflected very small 
samples of respondents with a large range of hours of due diligence, the Winsorized 
version of the number of hours of due diligence was less sensitive to outliers, yet still 
provided a reasonable estimate of central tendency.  The mean hours of due diligence 
after Winsorizing was 34.3 with a standard deviation of 48.8 hours. 
Though the percentage of wealth an angel invested was not affected significantly 
by extreme outliers, for comparison the Winsorized version of percent of wealth is also 
depicted.  The number of hours spent on due diligence was determined by asking the 
angel investor what is the “number of hours you spent on due diligence before 
investing?”  The average respondent spent close to 61 hours on due diligence prior to 
investing, with a substantial variation in due diligence (per the standard deviation and 
range).  The percentage of wealth invested has a mean of 14%, and a substantial variation 
(per the standard deviation and range).  The number of post-investment interactions has a 
mean of close to 61 times per year, and a substantial variation. 
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Table 1 
Summary of Variables           
Variable                       Description  
Diligence  Number of hours of due diligence this investor conducted prior to  
   making their investment 
Wealthpercent  Percentage of their personal wealth the angel investor held in angel 
   investments 
Interaction  Frequency of interaction (times per year) this angel investor had 
(times per year) with this company: 365 =daily, 52 = weekly, 12 = monthly,  
   4 = quarterly, 1 = annually, 0 = rarely if at all 
 
Demographics   
log_age  Log of age at time of investment 
gender   1 = male 
edlevel   Highest level of education achieved by the angel investor: 1 =  
   Bachelor's, 2 = Master's, 3 = JD, 4 = PhD 
   
Angel Investor Experience    
yearsinv  Number of years that the angel investor has been investing 
yearsentre  Number of years that the angel investor has been an entrepreneur 
numfounded  Number of firms the angel investor previously founded 
totalinv  Total number of angel investments that the respondent has made 
totalexits  Total number of angel investment exits that the respondent has  
   experienced 
TMT _experience TMT_experience = 1 if: foundedledteam, earliersuccessteam,  
   largfirmexpteam, techexpteam, mgmtexpteam, salesexpteam;  
   otherwise 0 
mgmtexpteam  Angel investor's assessment of the top management’s experience  
   as one of top three risks at the time of their investment, 1 = yes 
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Stage of the venture at the time of investment 
Stage: Seed 1= yes, this venture was in the seed stage at the time of the   Investment 
Stage: Startup 1=yes, this venture was in the startup stage at the time of the   Investment 
   
Syndication 
Co-investors  Number of other co-investors that joined in the investment in this  
   venture at the time this angel investor invested. 
Source 
sourcegroupscreen This angel investor “sourced” this venture investment from  
   the initial screening meeting of their group, 1 = yes; otherwise 0 
 
Mean respondent age was slightly above 62 years, with the youngest respondent 
being 34 years of age and the oldest 87.  On average, the respondents had spent slightly 
over 10 years investing at the time these data were collected, with a range from no 
experience to 49 years of experience.  Mean time spent as an entrepreneur was slightly 
over 15 years, with a range from 0 to 50 years.  Mean number of firms founded was 
slightly below three, with a range between 0 to 23 firms.  The average respondent made 
close to 13 total investments, with a range from zero to 200 investments.  An angel 
investor exit occurs when the investment is considered to end.  These so-called “exits” 
include acquisitions by other companies or other investors, initial public offerings, and 
firm closures during the investment.  These data represent exits that spanned the last two 
decades (with most exits occurring since 2004).  The mean number of exits was slightly 
above five, with a range between 0 and 50.   
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics: Continuous Variables        
Variable                                        N             Mean             SD            Min           Max 
Outcomes 
Due Diligence  277     60.625      317.696        0        5000 
Due Diligence (Winsorized) 277     34.325     48.850       2         200 
Wealth Percent       716     13.901     15.781        0         100 
Wealth Percent (Winsorized) 716 13.652 14.664 1 70 
Interaction (times/year) 289 60.760 123.232 0 365 
 
Predictors 
Age 788 62.481 9.708 34 87 
Age (Log) 788 4.122 0.163 3.526 4.466 
Years Investing 814 10.484 9.381 0 49 
Years Entrepreneur 769 15.293 11.028 0 50 
N Firms Founded 769 2.860 3.388 0 23 
Total Investments 885 12.954 16.143 0 200 
Total Exits 949 5.148 9.608 0 50   
 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for categorical variables.  A frequency table 
was constructed reporting the sample sizes and percentages associated with each category 
of response for each variable.  An angel investor’s continued interaction with a company 
after the initial investment consists of coaching, mentoring, financial monitoring, and 
other forms of assistance.  Responses to the amount of interaction consisted of daily, 
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weekly, monthly, quarterly, annually, or rarely/never.  The category most commonly 
cited for interaction between the angel investor and the company was quarterly, with 
slightly over 28% of respondents providing this response.  The least noted category was 
annually (slightly above 7%).  
 Approximately 87% of the sample was male.  Nearly 55% of respondents had a 
Master’s degree, 28% a Bachelor’s degree, 10% a Ph.D., and 6% a JD. Only 
approximately 10% of respondents had some level of managerial experience, with most 
not having any.  VC investment measured whether this venture took on venture capital 
prior to the exit event.  This was found to be the case in approximately 15% of cases. 
Angel investors sourced the venture from a screening meeting of an angel group close to 
65% of the time.   
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Table 3  
Descriptive Statistics: Categorical Variables       
Measure                                   N                                           % 
Gender 
Female 105 13.08 
Male 698 86.92 
Total 803 100.00 
 
Education 
Bachelors 213 28.44 
Masters 413 55.14 
JD 47 6.28 
PHD 76 10.15 
Total 749 100.00 
 
Top Management Team (TMT) Experience  
No 1,163 90.09 
Yes 128 9.91 
Total 1,291 100.00 
   
Stage: Seed  
No 1,166 90.32 
Yes 125 9.68 
Total 1,291 100.00 
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Stage: Startup  
No 1,118 86.60 
Yes 173 13.40 
Total 1,291 100.00 
 
Source: Group Screening 
No 188 35.40 
Yes 343 64.60 
Total 531 100.00     
 
Initial Models 
 This analysis utilized those variables necessary to examine the influencers of 
angel investor behavior based on the literature.  Because data concerning angel investing 
are difficult to attain—and the data set used here is the largest dataset available—this 
analysis with observations ranging from 134 to 641 compares favorably with other 
studies, such as Goldfarb, Hoberg, Kirsch, and Triantis (2009), which utilizes 32 angel 
investments, and Chua and Wu (2009) using a sample size of 57.   
 Poisson and Tobit regressions were estimated, along with logistic regressions and 
OLS regressions.  The logistic regressions and OLS regressions were primarily conducted 
for purposes of robustness tests.  While these results are not reported in this chapter, the 
analyses can be found in Appendix B. Inferences based on the supplemental analysis are 
similar to those described subsequently, suggesting the results are robust across empirical 
specifications. 
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Panels A and B of Table 4 summarize the results of the Poisson regressions, with 
due diligence as the outcome.  In panel A, six models were estimated in total, first with 
all experience variables and then with each measure of experience separately.  The 
pseudo R2 ranged from 0.03 to 0.18. 
With regard to the model conducted with all experience variables, the coefficients 
on the log of age, the number of years spent as an entrepreneur, the number of firms 
founded, and the total number of exits are statistically significant.  A statistically 
significant change in due diligence was found to be associated with reduced age, as well 
as a greater number of years spent as an entrepreneur, a greater number of firms founded, 
and a greater number of total exits taken.  Specifically, for each additional year of age, 
the angel performs approximately one hour less of due diligence.  
The second model in panel A included only years of investing experience out of 
all experience variables.  In this model, log of age failed to achieve statistical 
significance, but statistical significance was indicated with respect to the number of years 
spent investing.  Specifically, a statistically significant change in due diligence was 
associated with a greater number of years spent investing.  In this model, respondent 
gender was also found to achieve statistical significance: male investors spent a greater 
amount of time on due diligence than female investors. The remaining models in panel A 
also indicated males spent an average of about 16-17 hours more on due diligence than 
females.  For each additional year of investing experience, angels spent one additional 
hour on due diligence. 
The subsequent model focused on years spent as an entrepreneur. Statistical 
significance was found with respect to the log of age, and respondent gender, as well as 
71 
 
 
 
the number of years spent as an entrepreneur.  Specifically, a statistically significant 
change in due diligence was associated with reduced respondent age, male respondents, 
and a greater number of years as an entrepreneur.  For each additional year an angel has 
spent as an entrepreneur, they perform about 1.3 hours in additional due diligence. 
The fourth model focused on the number of firms founded.  Statistical 
significance was obtained for respondent gender as well as the number of firms founded.  
As in the previous models, male respondents were found to spend a greater amount of 
time on due diligence as compared with female respondents, and a greater number of 
firms founded was associated with augmented due diligence.  The number of firms 
previously founded indicated that for each additional firm the angel had founded resulted 
in around 2.3 to 3 additional hours of time spent on due diligence. 
The following model focused on the total number of investments.  Statistical 
significance was again found for respondent gender and also indicated with respect to the 
total number of investments made.  The results of this analysis indicated that a greater 
amount of due diligence was associated with male respondents as well as a greater total 
number of investments. 
In the final model in panel A, total exits were focused on among the set of 
experience measures.  Findings of this analysis indicated that a statistically significant 
change in due diligence was associated with male respondents compared with female 
respondents, and greater due diligence was related to a greater number of total exits 
experienced.  The discrete change in probability for each of the values observed is the 
average marginal effects (AME).  The AME reflects for each additional exit the angel has 
experienced, he will perform and about 1.4 additional hours of due diligence. 
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These results suggest that angel investors’ years investing, years entrepreneurial 
experience, number of firms founded, total previous investments, and total exits influence 
angels to conduct more time on due diligence.  These results are inconsistent with prior 
studies that suggest entrepreneurs are more susceptible to cognitive biases than are non-
entrepreneurs (Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Forbes, 2005).  Busenitz and Barney (1997) 
contend that “those who are more susceptible to the use of biases and heuristics in 
decision making are the very ones who are most likely to become entrepreneurs.”  These 
cognitive biases are thought processes that include erroneous assumptions and inferences 
and are a natural and common phenomenon.  Although these biases and heuristics 
represent shortcuts that can help deal with large volumes of information, they can 
interfere with effective decision making.  Biases and heuristics associated with additional 
experience should have indicated less time on due diligence as experiences increased.  
Research has not concluded whether entrepreneurs are a “certain kind of 
individual” inclined to favor instinct and spontaneity, or if entrepreneurs are accustomed 
to resorting to cognitive biases when experiencing conditions of information overload, 
high uncertainty, and time pressure (Forbes, 2005).  In the case of angel investors, prior 
experience as an entrepreneur, a greater number of firms founded, a greater number of 
investments, and a greater number of total exits may have provided sufficient exposure to 
the challenges of new start-ups, thus tempering angels’ initial judgment about their 
knowledge and overcoming their potential susceptibility to overconfidence bias.   
Given that younger angel investors performed more time on due diligence than 
older angel investors, younger angel investors may have had less time than their older 
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counterparts to develop biases or may have realized the impact of judgmental errors on 
their overall portfolio, thereby mitigating their tendency to overestimate their knowledge. 
 Education was not significant in the models.  This may be due to a lack of 
variation in education of the angel investors in our sample, as almost all investors in our 
sample have a high level of education.  The lowest level reported by responding angels 
was a Bachelor’s degree. 
 In the Table 4 regressions, an angel investor’s time spent on due diligence 
changed dynamically with his experience level.  Younger angels with less experience 
performed more due diligence prior to investing.  Then, the results suggest that angel 
investors with more experience perform more due diligence.  This could be interpreted as 
angels were not overconfident when they began to invest and thus performed more due 
diligence.  Then, as the angels aged and gained experience, they performed less due 
diligence.  Finally, they tended to develop a more realistic assessment of their abilities as 
they gained increased experience through their years as an entrepreneur, the number of 
firms founded, and the number of exits experienced.  This finding is consistent with 
Gervais and Odean (2001), who find that traders become overconfident, learn about their 
abilities, and then better recognize their true ability later.
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Table 4  Panel A 
       
Due Diligence - Poisson regressions 
Variable 
model with 
all 
experience 
variables 
with yearsinv 
experience 
only 
with 
yearsentre 
experience 
only 
with 
numfounded 
experience 
only 
with totalinv 
experience 
only 
with 
totalexits 
experience 
only 
Age (Log) 
-1.18** -0.58 -1.02* -0.24 -0.22 -0.25 
(-2.17) (-1.08) (-1.92) (-0.49) (-0.42) (-0.48) 
[-40.15]   [-34.64]       
Gender 
0.26 0.47** 0.48** 0.52** 0.47** 0.49** 
(1.26) (2.32) (2.24) (2.47) (2.38) (2.38) 
 
[15.70] [16.45] [17.59] [16.23] [16.82] 
Education 
-0.08 -0.06 -0.09 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 
(-0.85) (-0.59) (-0.92) (-0.52) (-0.31) (-0.30) 
            
Years Investing 
0.01 0.03*** 
    (0.77) (3.07) 
    
 
[1.01] 
    
Years Entrepreneur 
0.02**   0.04***       
(2.21) 
 
(3.83) 
   [0.83]   [1.32]       
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N Firms 
Founded 
0.07***     0.09***     
(4.03) 
  
(5.41) 
  [2.31]     [3.04]     
Total 
Investments 
-0.02       0.01**   
(-0.97) 
   
(2.23) 
         [0.50]   
Total Exits 
0.04** 
    
0.04*** 
(1.97) 
    
(4.15) 
[1.39] 
    
[1.38] 
Constant 7.64*** 5.32** 6.86*** 3.87** 3.92* 4.01** 
(3.55) (2.52) (3.31) (1.99) (1.85) (1.98) 
Observations 246 248 249 249 247 249 
Pseudo R2 0.18 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.03 0.05 
Note: A single asterisk (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 10-percent level, a double asterisk (**) 
indicates significance at the 5-percent level, and a triple asterisk (***) indicates significance at the 1-percent level.  
Robust z-statistics are in parentheses.  AMEs - average marginal effects are the discrete changes from the base 
levels and are displayed in brackets [ ] for statistically significant coefficients.     
 
76 
 
 
 
Next, panel B of Table 4 reports the results of the Poisson regression models on 
due diligence with additional predictors.  As before, the outcome measure in all models is 
the number of hours on due diligence.  Here, three Poisson models were estimated in 
total, consisting of the following: a model focusing on demographics, angel investor’s 
experience, angel perception of the TMT experience, and number of co-investors.  Then a 
model with the same variables as the first model along with the stage of the investment 
and whether the angel perceived the TMT as a strategic risk at the time of the investment 
was performed.  Finally, a model that consisted of demographics, angel experience, angel 
perception of the TMT experience, number of co-investors, stage of the investment when 
the angel invested, and source of the investment as predictors was tested.  The pseudo R2 
for the panel B regressions were 0.19, 0.28 and 0.27, respectively.  
With regard to the first model with additional variables, statistical significance 
was indicated with respect to the log of respondent age, years spent as an entrepreneur, 
and number of firms founded.  Results of this model indicated a statistically significant 
change in due diligence was associated with reduced respondent age, a greater number of 
years spent as an entrepreneur, and a greater number of firms founded which led to more 
time spent on due diligence.  Specifically, for each additional year of age, the angel 
investor performed about 45 minutes less on due diligence.  For each additional year as 
an entrepreneur, the angel performed almost an additional hour on due diligence.  And, 
for each additional firm the angel had founded, he performed a little over 2 hours 
additional due diligence.   
 The second Poisson regression model conducted focused on management and 
stage of the investment risk.  In this model, statistical significance was indicated with 
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respect to the log of respondent age, number of years spent investing, number of firms 
founded, and greater perceived strategic risk posed by the management team, as well as 
seed stage and startup stage measures.  Findings of this model indicated a statistically 
significant change in due diligence was associated with reduced respondent age, a greater 
number of years spent investing, a greater number of firms founded, and a greater 
perceived strategic risk as posed by the management team, as well as the venture not 
being in the seed or startup stages.  The AME indicate that for each additional year of 
investing experience, the angel spends about an additional hour and 20 minutes on due 
diligence.  When the angel perceives the TMT to be a strategic risk, he perform about 20 
additional hours on due diligence.  When the investment is in the seed stage, angels 
perform about 22 hours less due diligence.  When the investment is in the startup stage, 
the angel performs about 26 hours less due diligence.  The reduced due diligence in these 
stages may be a result of less financial data to examine due to the early stages.   
 The third model estimated incorporated group screening as a source measure.  If 
the source of the investment was determined through the angel group’s initial screening 
efforts versus from a referral from a friend, referral from a professional, or a previous 
working relationship, then the deal might have more information asymmetry. 
 In this model, statistical significance was indicated with respect to number of 
years spent investing, number of firms founded, and source being a group screening.  
Specifically, for each year of investing experience, the angel spent about an additional 
hour on due diligence.  When the deal source was a group screening the angel spent about 
22 less hours on due diligence.   
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These results also suggest that younger angel investors spent more time on due 
diligence than older angel investors.  Angels with more experience spend more time on 
due diligence, perhaps because they are more aware of the importance of due diligence.  
Angels investing after a group screening performed less due diligence, which may 
indicate that group screening allows more efficient due diligence.  It is also possible that 
angels were motivated by something other than reducing information asymmetry and 
increasing return on investment.  Their decisions might have been affected by more status 
or social responsibility associated with committing to an investment with their peer 
angels.  Angels might have been willing to accept more risk to achieve such goals (i.e., 
Statman, 2008).    
The influence of herding behavior is also considered.  This behavior would be 
characterized by whether or not angels were influenced by other angels investing in a 
project.  If investors commit errors only at an individual level, then the error would be 
neutralized given they are randomly distributed, causing the angel investing market to be 
efficient.  However, if after a group presentation, the individual investors decide to invest 
based on the group behavior that may have contained errors, this investing behavior - that 
increases based on the number of previous adopters - is known as herding and is based on 
cognitive error and is irrational (Szyszka, 2008; Welch, 1999).  The final due diligence 
model in panel B indicates that the number of co-investors is significant; however, angels 
perform more due diligence when more investors are involved; thus, herding behavior 
does not appear to be an influence in due diligence decisions. 
Angel investors rely on deal referrals from many sources.  Some sources may be 
more informationally reliable than others, thus reducing investment risk (Aram, 1989; 
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Wetzel, 1986).  Angel investors in this case did not expect to be defrauded and were not 
what finance theorists would consider “rational expectations” investors; rather, they were 
“trusting investors” (Stout, 2010).  Trust is an important force in explaining investor 
behavior, and many investors base their investments on trust.  However, the trust model 
of behavior explains bubbles by suggesting that they occur when investors do not pay 
attention to fundamentals (Stout, 2010).  In this model, angel investors perform less due 
diligence when the deal was sourced from a group screening. 
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Table 4 - Panel B 
    
Due Diligence - Poisson regressions   
Variable 
model with 
additional 
variables 
mgmtrisk source 
Age (Log) 
-1.14* -1.19* -0.97 
(-1.92) (-1.89) (-1.53) 
[-39.54] [-39.25] 
 
Gender 
0.02 0.17 -0.05 
(0.08) (0.54) (-0.19) 
      
Education 
-0.00 -0.08 -0.00 
(-0.04) (-0.69) (-0.04) 
   
Years Investing 
0.00 0.04** 0.03** 
(0.20) (2.22) (2.24) 
  [1.35] [1.11] 
Years Entrepreneur 
0.02* 0.02 0.02 
(1.81) (1.29) (1.05) 
[0.82] 
  
N Firms Founded 
0.07*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 
(4.01) (3.07) (3.16) 
[2.39] [2.05] [1.69] 
Total Investments 
-0.00 0.00 0.01 
(-0.31) (0.31) (0.87) 
   
Total Exits 
0.01 -0.02 -0.03 
(0.53) (-0.93) (-1.18) 
      
TMT Experience 
-0.07 -0.34 -0.26 
(-0.39) (-1.34) (-1.01) 
   
Management Risk 
  0.61**   
 
(2.43) 
   [20.13]   
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Stage: Seed 
  -0.67** -0.27 
 
(-2.57) (-1.10) 
  [-22.18]   
Stage: Startup 
  -0.79*** -0.37 
 
(-2.93) (-1.51) 
  [-26.04]   
Co-investors 
-0.04 -0.01 -0.01 
(-1.47) (-0.25) (-0.34) 
   
Source: Group Screening 
    -0.69** 
  
(-2.39) 
    [-22.08] 
Constant 7.77*** 8.00*** 4.73 
(3.24) (3.13) (1.27) 
Observations 193 135 164 
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.28 0.27 
Note: A single asterisk (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 10-
percent level, a double asterisk (**) indicates significance at the 5-percent 
level, and a triple asterisk (***) indicates significance at the 1-percent level.  
Robust z-statistics are in parentheses. AMEs - average marginal effects are the 
discrete changes from the base levels and are displayed in brackets [ ] for 
statistically significant coefficients.   
 
Summarized in panels A and B of Table 5 are results of the Tobit regressions 
focusing on the percentage of wealth invested.  Panel A consisted of six Tobit regression 
models: a model with all experience variables, with solely years investing experience, 
with solely years spent as an entrepreneur experience, with solely the number of firms 
founded experience, with solely the total number of investments experience, and with 
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solely the total exits experience. Panel A of Table 5 had a pseudo R2 range from 0.01 to 
0.03. 
First, with regard to the Tobit regression model conducted with all experience 
variables, statistical significance was indicated with respect to the log of respondent age, 
number of years spent investing, number of years spent as an entrepreneur, number of 
firms founded, and total number of investments.  Specifically, a statistically significant 
change in percentage of wealth invested was associated with reduced respondent age, a 
greater number of years spent investing, a greater number of years spent as an 
entrepreneur, a greater number of firms founded, and a greater number of total 
investments. 
The second model focused specifically on number of years of investing 
experience.  In this model, statistical significance was indicated with respect to the log of 
respondent age and respondent gender, as well as the number of years spent investing. A 
statistically significant change in percentage of wealth invested was associated with 
reduced respondent age, male respondents, and a greater number of years spent investing. 
The number of years spent as an entrepreneur was the focus of the third model.  
Age and gender were again found to achieve statistical significance, as well as the 
number of years spent as an entrepreneur.  Specifically, a greater percentage of wealth 
invested was associated with reduced respondent age and male respondents.  A greater 
percentage of wealth invested was also associated with a greater number of years spent as 
an entrepreneur. 
The fourth Tobit regression model focused on the number of firms founded 
among the predictors relating to experience.  Significance was indicated with respect to 
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respondent age and gender, and the number of firms founded was also found to achieve 
statistical significance in this model.  As in the previous two models, a greater percentage 
of wealth invested was found to be associated with reduced respondent age and male 
respondents, as well as a greater number of firms founded. 
In the fifth model, the total number of investments was focused on among the set 
of predictors associated with investing experience.  Statistical significance was indicated 
with respect to respondent age and gender, as in the previous three models, and 
significance was also found for the total number of investments made.  The results with 
respect to respondent age and gender were in the same direction as the previous three 
models, with a greater percentage of wealth invested associated with reduced respondent 
age and male respondents.  Furthermore, it was also indicated that a greater number of 
total investments was associated with an increased percentage of wealth invested. 
The final model in panel A focused on the total number of exits with respect to 
the set of predictors associated with investing experience.  In this model, significance was 
again indicated with respect to respondent age and gender, and significance was shown 
with respect to the total number of exits.  A greater percentage of wealth invested was 
again associated with reduced respondent age and male respondents, with a greater 
number of total exits also found to be associated with a greater percentage of wealth 
invested. 
  Younger angel investors invested a larger percentage of their wealth; however, 
this may be a factor of not having as much total wealth as older investors.  Experience 
associated with years investing, years an entrepreneur, and the number of firms founded 
appeared to contribute to angel confidence in investing a larger percentage of wealth in 
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an investment.  However, these experience variables were also associated with greater 
due diligence, therefore, possibly confirming that angels are learning from their 
experiences, performing more due diligence and investing a larger percentage of wealth 
as they gain experience.  
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Table 5 - Panel A 
      
       Percentage of Wealth - Tobit regressions 
   
Variable 
model with all 
experience 
variables 
with yearsinv 
experience 
only 
with yearsentre 
experience 
only 
with 
numfounded 
experience 
only 
with totalinv 
experience 
only 
with totalexits 
experience 
only 
Age (Log) -24.19*** -20.10*** -20.52*** -12.63*** -12.84*** -12.80*** 
(-5.81) (-4.96) (-4.78) (-3.04) (-2.76) (-3.04) 
Gender 0.78 1.95* 2.83** 2.97** 2.52* 2.83** 
(0.71) (1.73) (2.13) (2.33) (1.89) (2.18) 
Education 0.06 0.60 -0.04 -0.46 0.17 0.32 
(0.09) (0.89) (-0.05) (-0.65) (0.22) (0.40) 
Years Investing 0.62*** 0.78***     (6.01) (8.16) 
    Years 
Entrepreneur 
0.10*   0.44***       
(1.92)   (7.93)       
N Firms Founded 0.76***   
1.32*** 
  (2.97) 
  
(4.83) 
  Total 
Investments 
0.20*       0.34***   
(1.93)       (2.86)   
Total Exits -0.20     
0.60*** 
(-1.29) 
    
(5.27) 
Constant 101.39*** 85.92*** 89.35*** 60.28*** 60.43*** 61.16*** 
(5.99) (5.20) (5.09) (3.58) (3.25) (3.54) 
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Observations 631 637 639 639 637 641 
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Note: A single asterisk (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 10-percent level, a double asterisk (**) indicates 
significance at the 5-percent level, and a triple asterisk (***) indicates significance at the 1-percent level.  Robust z-statistics 
in parentheses. 
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 Shown in panel B of Table 5 are the results of the Tobit regressions on the 
percentage of wealth invested with additional independent variables.  Three models were 
estimated in total. First the table reports on a model focusing on demographics, angel 
investor’s experience, angel perception of the TMT experience, and the number of co-
investors.  Next, a model with the same variables as the first model along with the stage 
of the investment and whether the angel perceived the TMT as a strategic risk at the time 
of the investment was estimated.  Finally, a model that consisted of demographics, angel 
experience, angel perception of the TMT experience, number of co-investors, stage of the 
investment when the angel invested, and the source of the investment as predictors was 
estimated.  The pseudo R2  in the panel B regressions were 0.05, 0.07 and 0.06, 
respectively. 
 With regard to the first model, statistical significance was indicated with respect 
to the log of respondent age, number of years spent investing, number of years the angel 
had been an entrepreneur, and angel investor’s perception of TMT experience.  
Specifically, a statistically significant change in the percentage of wealth invested was 
found to be associated with younger investors, a greater number of years spent investing, 
a greater number of years as an entrepreneur, and when the TMT was perceived to have 
more experience. 
 In the second model in panel B, which focused on management as a strategic risk 
and the stage of the investment risk, statistical significance with the log of investor age, 
number of years spent investing, number of years spent as an entrepreneur, and number 
of co-investors was obtained.  Specifically, a greater percentage of wealth invested was 
associated with reduced respondent age, a greater number of years spent investing, and a 
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reduced number of co-investors.  These results suggest that herding may not be an 
influence on percentage of wealth invested. 
 Consistent with prior literature, the results indicate that TMT experience was a 
key factor in a deal (MacMillan, Zemann, & Subbanarasimha, 1987; Van Osnabrugge & 
Robinson 2000).  Sudek (2006) found that angel investors looked for a track record of 
previous success in the TMT.  Study results suggested that angels value previous 
successful experience on the part of the TMT and would invest a larger percentage of 
their wealth when managers fit this criterion.   
 Finally, in the third Tobit regression model, statistical significance was achieved 
with respect to the log of respondent age, education level of the angel, number of years 
spent investing, and number of years spent as an entrepreneur.  In this model, it was 
found that a greater percentage of wealth invested was associated with reduced 
respondent age, reduced level of education, a greater number of years spent investing, a 
greater number of years spent as an entrepreneur. 
The results of the percentage of wealth invested analyses suggested that greater 
investment was associated with a reduced angel investor age.  Though this may be from 
overconfidence in younger angel investors, it is more likely a result of older investors 
having more total wealth.  As such, the amount invested by younger investors may have 
been the same as that invested by older investors; yet it likely represented a larger 
percentage of their total wealth.  Several studies find that both men and women exhibit 
overconfidence; however, men are generally more overconfident than women (Barber & 
Odean, 2001).  Barber and Odean (2001) also find that men trade more often than women 
and tend to have a lower investment performance. This analysis suggested male angel 
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investors invested a larger percentage of wealth than females.  Though a greater 
percentage of wealth invested was associated with reduced level of education, it must be 
noted that all the angels in this analysis were well-educated, with none of the respondents 
reporting less than a bachelor’s degree.  
 Angel investor experience proxies, including a greater number of years spent 
investing, years spent as an entrepreneur, firms founded, and total investments, resulted 
in a greater percentage of wealth invested.  This experience-based influence on the 
decision to invest a larger percentage of wealth may have been the result of recency.  
Recency refers to the situation where events that are most recent have a memory 
advantage over items retrieved from long-term memory.  The investor who has invested 
in deals and has been successful may remember these events positively and invest in 
additional deals.  The influence of investor past success can lead to overconfidence, less 
diversification, and more risk taking (Merkle, 2012).   
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Table 5 - Panel B 
    
   Percentage of Wealth - Tobit regressions. 
  
Variable 
model with 
additional 
variables 
mgmtrisk source 
Age (Log) -23.65*** -17.75** -18.97** 
(-3.43) (-2.23) (-2.53) 
Gender -0.81 -1.45 -1.76 
(-0.42) (-0.80) (-0.99) 
Education -0.86 -1.62 -1.94* 
(-0.87) (-1.37) (-1.90) 
Years Investing 0.63*** 1.09*** 1.10*** 
(3.25) (4.71) (4.51) 
Years Entrepreneur 0.26*** 0.18 0.28*** 
(2.69) (1.57) (2.82) 
N Firms Founded 0.39 0.54 0.36 
(1.15) (1.54) (1.00) 
Total Investments 0.19 0.26 0.07 
(1.27) (1.65) (0.41) 
Total Exits -0.26 -0.33 -0.19 
(-0.95) (-1.21) (-0.68) 
TMT Experience 3.99* 0.11  (1.72) (0.03) 
 
Management Risk   -0.28 1.20 
  (-0.13) (0.40) 
Stage: Seed  
-1.87 -1.57 
 
(-0.57) (-0.67) 
Stage: Startup   -1.94 -1.07 
  (-0.75) (-0.49) 
Co-investors -0.28 -0.40*** -0.31 
(-1.39) (-2.66) (-1.25) 
Source: Group Screening     2.36 
    (0.76) 
Constant 100.59*** 79.75** 83.79*** 
(3.58) (2.39) (2.73) 
Observations 192 135 163 
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Pseudo R2 0.05 0.07 0.06 
Note: A single asterisk (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 10-
percent level, a double asterisk (**) indicates significance at the 5-percent level, 
and a triple asterisk (***) indicates significance at the 1-percent level.  Robust z-
statistics in parentheses. 
 
Depicted in panels A and B of Table 6 are results of the Poisson regressions 
focusing on post-investment interaction, measured as the number of interactions per year.  
In panel A, six regression models were estimated: a model with all experience variables, 
with solely years spent investing, with solely years spent as an entrepreneur, with solely 
the number of firms founded, with solely the total number of investments, and with solely 
the total number of exits with respect to the experience measures.  The pseudo R2 ranged 
from 0.02 to 0.17 for the regressions in panel A. 
 The model incorporating all experience variables revealed statistical significance 
with respect to the number of years spent investing only.  Specifically, a statistically 
significant change in the amount of years investing, years as an entrepreneur, and number 
of firms founded experience were associated with greater interaction.  The second model 
focused on the number of years spent investing with regard to these experience measures.  
The results of this model indicated statistical significance with regard to the number of 
years spent investing, with a greater amount of experience associated with more years 
investing experience.  For both models the average marginal effects (AME) indicate that 
for each additional year of investing experience, the angel will provide approximately 
three additional interactions per year with the firm. 
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 The third model focusing on the number of years spent as an entrepreneur 
revealed that a greater number of years spent as an entrepreneur was associated with a 
greater amount of interaction.  The AMEs suggest that for every additional year of 
entrepreneurial experience, an angel provides approximately 2.6 additional interactions 
with the firm each year. 
 The number of firms founded was the focus of the fourth Poisson regression. 
Statistical significance was obtained with regard to this predictor, with a greater number 
of firms founded associated with a greater amount of interaction.  The AME reflects one 
additional interaction per year for each additional firm that the angel has founded.  In the 
final two models, focusing upon the total number of investments and the total number of 
exits, respectively, no statistically significant results were found.
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Table 6  Panel A 
       
Post Investment Interaction - Poisson regressions 
Variable 
model with 
all 
experience 
variables 
with 
yearsinv 
experience 
only 
with 
yearsentre 
experience 
only 
with 
numfounded 
experience 
only 
with totalinv 
experience 
only 
with 
totalexits 
experience 
only 
Age (Log) 
-0.58 0.13 -0.02 0.98 1.22 1.21 
(-0.60) (0.15) (-0.02) (1.02) (1.27) (1.26) 
            
Gender 
-0.11 -0.01 0.12 0.18 0.17 0.19 
(-0.24) (-0.02) (0.25) (0.39) (0.37) (0.40) 
            
Education 
-0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.10 
(-0.37) (0.35) (0.30) (0.29) (0.79) (0.78) 
      
Years Investing 
0.05*** 0.05***         
(3.97) (4.13) 
    [3.28] [3.07]         
Years Entrepreneur 
0.03** 
 
0.04*** 
   (2.09) 
 
(3.50) 
   
  
[2.64] 
   
N Firms Founded 
0.05**     0.06***     
(2.33) 
  
(2.87) 
  [2.93]     [1.06]     
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Total Exits 
-0.02         0.01 
(-0.45) 
    
(0.69) 
            
Constant 5.91 3.00 3.41 -0.33 -1.22 -1.22 
(1.53) (0.82) (0.89) (-0.08) (-0.31) (-0.32) 
Observations 242 244 245 245 243 245 
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.02 
Note: A single asterisk (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 10-percent level, a double asterisk (**) 
indicates significance at the 5-percent level, and a triple asterisk (***) indicates significance at the 1-percent level.  
Robust z-statistics are in parentheses. AMEs - average marginal effects are the discrete changes from the base 
levels and are displayed in brackets [ ] for statistically significant coefficients.   
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Panel B of Table 6 reports the Poisson regression results focusing upon post-
investment interaction with additional predictors.  Three models similar to those in Panel 
B of Table 5 were estimated.  The pseudo R2 in the panel B regressions were 0.21, 0.31, 
and 0.26, respectively.  
 With regard to the first Poisson regression model in panel B of Table 6, statistical 
significance was indicated with respect to number of years spent investing, total number 
of firms founded, and number of co-investors.  A greater amount of post-investment 
interaction was associated with greater number of years spent investing, greater number 
of firms founded, and reduced number of co-investors.  The AME indicate that for each 
additional year of investing experience the angels have, they will provide approximately 
2.7 additional interactions with the firm.  For each additional firm the angel has founded, 
he will provide about 2.5 additional interactions with the firm; and for each additional co-
investor that is involved in the deal, the angel will provide over six fewer post investment 
interactions with the firm.  
  In the second regression model focusing on measures relating to management 
risk and the stage of the investment as risk predictors, statistical significance was 
indicated with respect to the number of years spent investing, number of years as an 
entrepreneur, number of firms founded, total previous investments, and management 
team perceived as a strategic risk.  An increased amount of post-investment interaction 
was associated with increased years investing, increased years as an entrepreneur, 
increased number of firms founded, fewer total investments, and when management is 
perceived a strategic risk.  Specifically, the AME indicate that for each additional 
investment the angel is involved in, the angel will provide approximately three less 
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interactions per year.  This finding may be a result of available time when angels are 
involved in additional deals.  The AMEs for angels reporting that they perceive the TMT 
to be a strategic risk indicates that the angel will perform 55 more interactions per year.  
These additional interactions may be for assistance in training the TMT or may be angels 
way of monitoring.  These results suggest that experience assisted the angel investor in 
getting involved after the investment.  This may have been to share knowledge with the 
entrepreneur and assist the venture to success.  Additional interaction with the venture 
when the management team was perceived to be a strategic risk may suggest that angels 
perceived that they were capable of training existing managers or replacing them to 
insure the business succeeds.  Angels investing after determining that the management 
team was a strategic risk suggests that angel investors believed they could overcome the 
problem, an indicator of confidence in their abilities.  Contributing more post-investment 
interaction when there were fewer co-investors may be out of necessity: there are fewer 
co-investors to share in the responsibilities. 
 The final model incorporating variables associated with the source of the deal 
found statistical significance with respect to the number of years investing experience.  
Specifically, a greater amount of post-investment interaction was associated with the 
number of years investing experience.  Economically, when angel investors invest in a 
deal, they will interact with the venture about 2.4 more times per year for each additional 
year of investing experience they have.   
 In these analyses, angel investors appear to have learned from prior investing 
experiences how much value they could add to the investment through providing 
additional post-investment interaction.  Angel investing is unique in this aspect of 
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investing.  Post-investment interaction is often not an option in other types of investing.  
However, angels can utilize their skills and previous experiences to provide post-
investment interaction to improve the performance of the venture.   
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Table 6 - Panel B 
    
Post investment interaction - Poisson regressions  
Variable 
model with 
additional 
variables 
mgmtrisk source 
Age (Log) 
0.32 -0.22 0.21 
(0.29) (-0.17) (0.18) 
   
Gender 
-0.50 -0.38 -0.45 
(-1.38) (-1.16) (-1.18) 
      
Education 
-0.09 -0.19 -0.06 
(-0.75) (-1.21) (-0.44) 
   
Years Investing 
0.04*** 0.04* 0.04** 
(2.97) (1.82) (2.36) 
[2.69] [2.77]   
Years Entrepreneur 
0.03 0.04* 0.02 
(1.53) (1.73) (0.81) 
 
[3.20] 
 
N Firms Founded 
0.03** 0.04* 0.03 
(2.12) (1.95) (1.31) 
[2.53] [3.00]   
Total Investments 
-0.01 -0.04** -0.01 
(-0.63) (-2.16) (-0.45) 
 
[-3.15] 
 
Total Exits 
-0.05 -0.05 -0.04 
(-1.13) (-0.78) (-0.80) 
      
TMT Experience 
0.30 0.44 0.23 
(1.11) (1.41) (0.65) 
   
Management Risk 
  0.75**   
 
(2.47) 
   [55.58]   
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Stage: Seed 
  -0.62 0.03 
 
(-1.46) (0.07) 
      
Stage: Startup  
-0.25 0.27 
 
(-0.63) (0.68) 
      
Co-investors 
-0.09* -0.06 -0.07 
(-1.93) (-1.14) (-1.29) 
[-6.26]     
Source: Group Screening   
-0.83 
  
(-1.62) 
      
Constant 3.11 5.23 3.51 
(0.70) (1.01) (0.74) 
Observations 185 134 162 
Pseudo R2 0.21 0.31 0.26 
Note: A single asterisk (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 10-
percent level, a double asterisk (**) indicates significance at the 5-percent level, 
and a triple asterisk (***) indicates significance at the 1-percent level.  Robust 
z-statistics are in parentheses. AMEs - average marginal effects are the discrete 
changes from the base levels and are displayed in brackets [ ] for statistically 
significant coefficients..   
 
Correlations between Interaction and Due Diligence 
Finally, correlations were conducted between the measure of interaction and due 
diligence.  First, a Spearman’s correlation was estimated between interaction and due 
diligence.  This correlation is large and significant, ρ(252) = .5583, p < .001.  This result 
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indicated that a greater amount of time spent on due diligence was associated with more 
frequent interaction.  Another Spearman’s correlation was estimated for post-investment 
interaction and due diligence with the Winsorized version of due diligence.  An almost 
identical result was obtained, ρ(252) = .5582, p < .001. 
Summary  
 This chapter presented the results of the study.  Initially, a series of descriptive 
statistics were computed.  The focus of these analyses was on measures of central 
tendency and variability for the continuous items included in the investigation.  Also 
included was a frequency table, reporting the sample sizes and percentages associated 
with each response category for the categorical measures.  Then, several sets of 
regression analyses were estimated focusing on the outcome variables of number of hours 
spent on due diligence, percentage of wealth invested, and level of interaction the angel 
investor had with the company.  Spearman correlations were also conducted between the 
level of post-investment interaction and due diligence.  Overall, significant results are 
found in the regression models.  Findings will be discussed in further detail in the 
following chapter, which will also serve to relate these findings to previous literature and 
theory.
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CHAPTER 5 – DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
  
 This chapter discusses the results vis-a-vis previous literature and theory, and also 
notes study limitations and avenues for future research.  Findings of this investigation 
provide important implications with regard to germane extant literature and theory. 
Examination of the decisions of angel investors enhances our understanding of alternative 
investor situations where investors make risky decisions without the benefit of 
professional portfolio advisors.  The individual investor, or angel in this case, instead of 
relying on a professional advisor, may have a tendency to rely on biases and heuristics to 
simplify risky decisions.   
Discussion 
Several distinct patterns of results are found regarding percentage of wealth 
invested.  Older investors are associated with a reduced percentage of wealth invested.  
Also, higher values for years investing, years as an entrepreneur, number of firms 
founded, and number of angel investments are associated with a higher percentage of 
wealth invested.  Number of years as an entrepreneur is consistently associated with 
increased due diligence, as is number of firms founded.  Future researchers are cautioned 
against using age as an experience measure in angel investing, as angel investors not only 
skew older; but also experience related variables in angel investing are difficult to 
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disentangle from age.  For example, as an angel get older, he will have more years 
investing, more years as an entrepreneur, and more exits. 
 The results of these analyses suggest that demographics and investor experience 
appear to be important determinants of due diligence.  The greater number of firms 
founded and greater number of years as an entrepreneur suggest expertise in 
entrepreneurship.  Much of the literature on expertise suggests that biases and heuristics 
influence experts in many areas (Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002). Miscalibration is 
often reported in expert opinion, often resulting in overconfidence.  Miscalibration is the 
tendency to believe that information is more accurate than it actually is and can lead to 
poor judgment.  However, education and investing experience are helpful in reducing 
biases (Agnew & Szykman, 2005). The current results seemingly support this conjecture. 
Angels tend to be highly educated, and those with more years as an entrepreneur and 
investment experience spend more time on due diligence; such efforts should reduce the 
effect of miscalibration and overconfidence.   
 Use of heuristics, or shortcuts, to search for solutions often involves biases that 
can be large.  These biases can shape the nature of heuristics.  Sometimes simple 
heuristics that require relatively little calculation effort, known as “fast and frugal” 
heuristics, may be efficient if the decision environment is unchanged.  However, such 
heuristics may not perform well if all alternatives are not similar and they involve some 
overly familiar factors (Gigerenzer, 2004).   
Because angel investors are generally wealthy, examination of biases and other 
influences on their investment decisions is appropriate.  Bias associated with 
overconfidence and recency/primacy is indicated by angels investing larger percentages 
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of their wealth when they have more years of experience as an entrepreneur, more 
investing experience, and a larger number of investments.  Recent success in an 
investment, or a previous similar investment that was very successful, may influence the 
percent of wealth decision.  The decision may also be a result of the overconfidence bias 
resulting from past success in business.  The tendency to take too much credit for their 
past successes might well lead to overconfidence in their abilities. 
 The findings in this study reveal that a greater percentage of wealth invested is 
associated with reduced age, as well as variables related to experience, including an 
increased number of years investing, years as an entrepreneur, number of firms founded, 
and number of investments.  With younger investors, a smaller investment may represent 
a larger portion of the investor’s total wealth.   
 Overconfidence did not appear to be a factor in reduced due diligence in the risky 
investment of angels.  The literature suggests that more successful investors are more 
likely to update their beliefs; however, they overweight the possibility that their success 
was from their own abilities rather than from chance or outside factors.  This leads to 
their becoming overconfident (Gervais & Odean, 2001).  If angel investors with a greater 
number of years as an entrepreneur and a larger number of firms founded are more likely 
to be overconfident, we would expect them to perform less due diligence.  However, we 
find that such angel investors perform more due diligence.  This may be because angel 
investors with a greater number of years as an entrepreneur and a larger number of firms 
founded have previously experienced negative results from poor diligence or that the 
angel has learned how to do better due diligence over time. Another possibility is that 
more experienced angels “champion” a deal to perform the due diligence for others.  
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Payne and Macarty (2002) find that angel groups may have industry “experts” who 
“champion” a deal and tend to conduct the investment due diligence.  Their due diligence 
tends to be better due diligence than they would engage in to satisfy themselves in an 
effort to protect their reputation.  Some “champions” may also provide due diligence 
training to other angel investors to mentor them in the due diligence process, thus 
engaging in additional hours of due diligence. 
Deals sourced through group screenings result in decreased due diligence.  The 
investment in an entrepreneur’s venture indicates a trusting relationship. Trust builds on 
psychology of human behavior characteristics (e.g., altruism, fairness, morality, ethics).  
Blau (1964) found that social exchange “tends to engender feelings of personal 
obligations, gratitude, and trust; purely economic exchange as such does not” (p.94).  
Although angel investors perform less due diligence in deals sourced through group 
screening, they appear to develop trust in the entrepreneur and the idea as depicted by the 
investment.  Angel investors are also likely to have some trust in other members of their 
groups. Therefore, this analysis adds to the literature on social exchange theory and 
incorporates “trust” as an additional element of a behavioral consideration between the 
investor and source of the deal that influences the due diligence decision.   
One of the earliest sources of a potential investment is the group screening, where 
angels make an initial determination if a deal is a good fit.  Analysis of the amount of 
time spent on due diligence suggests that group screening is significant. However, angels 
perform less due diligence when they source a deal at this initial stage. This suggests 
angels may be investing based on “gut instinct” which could be a result of 
overconfidence.  Overconfidence is the belief that one’s personal qualities (such as ability 
105 
 
 
 
to select the right deal) are better than they really are.  Fischhoff (2002) suggests a 
mismatch between judges and tasks may occur as a result of hindsight bias or 
overconfidence.  Researchers offer overconfidence as an explanation for wars, stock 
market bubbles, and entrepreneurial failures (Glaser, Nöth, & Weber, 2004; Moore & 
Healey, 2008).  The reduced amount of time spent on due diligence when investing after 
a group screening or through a referral and the increased amount of time on due diligence 
with being personal friends with the entrepreneur suggest issues that involve 
overconfidence bias.  Barber and Odean (2001) find that overconfident investors tend to 
invest more in assets with which they are familiar.  Kahneman and Frederick (2002) 
found that familiarity belongs to the family of recognition heuristics which “draws on 
‘natural assessment’ of recognition or familiarity, may be endorsed as a deliberate 
strategy, makes people look smart under some conditions, and will produce systematic 
errors and biases.”  Overconfidence and familiarity may lead to a tendency to overvalue 
certainty or to ignore very low probabilities (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).  
Models are also estimated involving the source of the deal on time spent on due 
diligence, percent of wealth, and interaction.  The “source of the deal” predictors are only 
found to be significant in the due diligence regression models.  These results generally 
suggest that when a respondent sources a deal through the initial group screening  less 
time is spent on due diligence.  It is not necessarily irrational to spend less time on due 
diligence on projects when the angel investor has superior information asymmetry.  
However, lower due diligence may reflect the influence of prior experience and lead to 
the use of heuristics or success or overconfidence bias.  In this case, decisions may be 
less than fully rational.  
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Prior research suggests that due diligence decisions are affected by group 
structure that allows “experts” to evaluate and monitor deals (DeGennaro, 2010; Mason 
& Harrison, 2008).  Investing alongside others, or syndication, can facilitate due 
diligence and post-investment interaction between the angel investor and the 
entrepreneur.  This can add value to an investment if investors are able to share their 
specific knowledge and complementary skills.  Das and Teng (2002) argue that a social 
exchange of controls is a process of social sanctions and cooperative culture which 
typically results in all individual investors contributing to the success of the investment 
through their individual strengths.  Thus, social exchange theory helps explain differing 
degrees of post-investment interaction between angel investors and entrepreneurs.   
 This study collected information on interaction reported (rarely, daily, weekly, 
monthly, quarterly, and annually).  High correlations are found between due diligence 
and interaction between the angel and the new firm.  This result indicates that a greater 
amount of time spent on due diligence is associated with more frequent interaction.  A 
series of models include interaction as the outcome measure.  Two models found that a 
greater number of years investing was associated with greater interaction.  Moreover, the 
angel investor having sourced the investment from the presentation meeting of the group 
is also related to less interaction.  Angel investors can offer post-investment assistance to 
the entrepreneur in many different ways, including building the management team, 
assisting to further develop the entrepreneur’s idea, bringing the product to market, and 
helping locate and secure future financing.  Because most angel investors invest in 
projects that are geographically close to their home, geographic proximity of the angel 
can be a major determinant of the amount of interaction.  Additionally, angels who are 
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familiar with issues confronting ventures may be able to contribute more to the success of 
the firm than angels who are less familiar.  An example would be a physician/angel 
investor may be more familiar with software relating to electronic medical records and 
might provide additional hours.  This same analogy may explain why an investment 
sourced in a group screening may result in less overall interaction – one angel may 
“champion” the deal as it is in his/her area of expertise.  Correlations are also conducted 
between interaction and due diligence.  These correlations are found to be positive, large, 
and statistically significant. Additional analysis is needed to determine the reasons for 
increased time spent on due diligence and more frequent interaction.  Possible rationales 
might be specific knowledge of the industry as well as interest and abilities on the part of 
the angel to assist the firm.   
Theoretical Implications 
This dissertation, while containing some similarities with the DeGennaro and 
Dwyer (2011) study, also contains a number of important differences.  The present study 
provides a comprehensive analysis of predictors of due diligence, percentage of wealth 
invested, and interaction with the company through a series of regression models.  
Therefore, in these analyses, a more detailed view of the predictors of angel decisions is 
ascertained.  Additionally, by expanding on the analyses conducted by DeGennaro and 
Dwyer (2011), the current study expands knowledge regarding behavioral influences on 
angel investors. 
Behavioral finance theory presents a challenge to Modern Portfolio Theory in that 
within behavioral finance theory, social, cognitive, and emotional factors are considered 
108 
 
 
 
to influence individual decisions of investors and provide biases that influence their 
choices.  Essentially, behavioral finance theory combines behavioral and cognitive 
theories of psychology with conventional economics and finance in order to help explain 
decisions that are made by investors (Ackert & Deaves, 2009; Ritter, 2003; Shiller, 
2003).  Previous study results suggest that individual investors are influenced by biases 
and heuristics.   
 The adaptive market hypothesis is a result of the challenges that behavioral 
finance provides to the efficient markets hypothesis.  Essentially, this theory builds on the 
psychology of human behavior, such as altruism, fairness, and ethics that create biases 
and help explain market dynamics (Lo, 2004).  Choices made by individuals are based on 
past experience and whether these experiences provided positive or negative 
reinforcement.  In addition, this theory suggests that individuals develop heuristics that 
assist them in adapting to economic challenges and also help them achieve optimal 
solutions (Lo, 2004; Reuber & Fischer, 1994).  This study finds that a greater number of 
years investing is associated with greater interaction.  The findings may suggest support 
for the adaptive markets hypothesis, as such individuals seemingly made decisions 
(previous investments) and then learned from those decisions (based on their previous 
experiences); whether those previous experiences provide positive or negative 
reinforcement (returns) lead angels to adapt by providing greater interaction with the 
entrepreneur.  This evolutionary model of individuals adapting by developing heuristics, 
experienced-based techniques, allows the traditional models of Modern Portfolio Theory 
to coexist with behavioral finance. 
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 Study results also reveal that individuals who spent a greater number of years 
investing and as an entrepreneur, and founded a larger number of firms, invest in a 
greater number of angel investments.  This suggests a possibility of the presence of the 
diversification heuristic.  The diversification heuristic suggests that some portion of 
investing is driven by behavioral attributes, such as sensation seeking, “trying a little bit 
of everything” when choices are not mutually exclusive, and overconfidence.  For 
example, sensation seekers like to try a variety of investments rather than risk missing out 
on a good thing, and overconfident investors have irrationally optimistic beliefs about the 
value of their contribution to the investment (Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2009).  
 In addition, those who have a more favorable perception of the top management 
team’s experience invested a greater percentage of their wealth.  The percentage of 
wealth invested is a proxy for risk tolerance and perceptions of the top management team. 
The current work thus suggests that rational motivations, like return on investment, 
cannot fully explain the number of risky investments as a percentage of wealth because 
some of the investments appear to be driven by behavioral factors. 
Limitations 
The study had certain limitations that merit attention. First, the data set is cross-
sectional, with a single set of respondents participating at one specific time point. 
Although cross-sectional data allow for examination of associations between measures, 
they do not allow determination of causality.  Therefore, though the study offers an 
indication of the extent to which the measures are related, it does not establish cause-and-
effect relations. 
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The R-squared values are low indicating that there is much variation that is not 
explained.  Although the R-squared values in some of the regressions are low, the 
significant coefficients on some independent variables indicate their meaningful 
influence on the key decisions of angel investors. 
Future Research 
Experienced investors devote more time on due diligence, invest a greater 
percentage of wealth in a deal, and provide more post-investment interaction.  Future 
studies should attempt to determine if expertise enables angels to identify deals that 
perform well. 
Interaction is not an option in the majority of financial investments. This may 
explain why angel investors are willing to risk a greater proportion of their wealth in 
riskier investments, even in cases where they do not spend a large amount of time on due 
diligence.  Future research could explore whether the ability to interact with these 
companies provides individuals with a sense of security, leading them to invest more and 
to risk a greater proportion of their wealth.  Additionally, investing in groups may also 
provide individuals with a sense of adequate interaction to drive them to invest a greater 
proportion of their wealth in these riskier investments, again by providing a sense of 
security through their own and co-investor interaction and due diligence. 
Conclusion 
This final chapter provides enhanced discussion of study results. Several 
important theoretical implications are discussed that are derived from the findings. As 
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individual investors, angels may be particularly influenced by behavioral factors such 
as cognitive biases and social influences.  There is strong evidence that experienced 
angel investors spend more time on due diligence, older investors spend less time on 
due diligence after controlling for investor experience. These results suggest that 
experienced angels invest in due diligence because they understand its importance. 
Gender, risk perception, stage of the investment, and source of the deal also influence 
due diligence. In addition, older angels are found to invest a smaller percentage of 
their wealth in a deal, perhaps because they seek to diversify holdings. More 
experienced angels, however, are found to invest a larger percentage of their wealth 
perhaps because experienced angels are more susceptible to cognitive biases such as 
overconfidence, or because they are able to identify ventures that will do well and 
choose to invest more in such ventures.  Deal syndication influences the percent of 
wealth invested in a deal.  Other results suggest that after making an investment, 
angels continue to interact with the companies they invest in.  There is strong evidence 
that more experienced angels are associated with greater post-investment interaction.  
Gender and risk perception influence the degree of post-investment interaction.  
Finally, suggestions for future research are offered that include examining whether 
experienced angel investors are better able to identify deals that perform well.  
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APPENDIX A - THE ANGEL INVESTOR PERFORMANCE PROJECT SURVEY 
 
The Performance Project: Group Angel Investor 
 
The Kauffman Foundation and the Angel Capital Education Foundation with Willamette 
University and the University of Washington (Researchers' Biographies) have initiated a 
research initiative to gather historical performance data from group-affiliated angel 
investors throughout North America. This effort will help to provide benchmarks, best 
practices, and perspective to the continued efforts of angel investors to make savvy 
investments in new ventures. The aggregate data will be released on May 24th at the 
2007 Angel Capital Association Summit in Chicago, Illinois. 
 
The survey is anticipated to take between 5 and 20 minutes. In appreciation for 
completing the survey, you can request notification of aggregated survey statistics, as 
well as a free copy of The Entrepreneurial Imperative by Carl Schramm, president and 
CEO of the Kauffman Foundation. 
 
The information you report in this survey is held strictly confidential, will be kept 
anonymous whether you include your contact information or not, and will be used only 
for non-commercial research purposes. 
 
 
 
 
 
The Performance Project: Group Angel Investor 
 
You are about to begin your survey. Average time to complete the survey is between 5 
and 20 minutes. You will answer questions regarding your angel investments, 
performance of those investments (including closures), and a range of other questions to 
provide context for the investment. 
 
At the top of the page, you will see a series of buttons next to the label "Steps" which will 
track your progress through the questionnaire. As you complete a screen click the "Next 
Step" button to proceed. To move back and forth, simply click these buttons; your data 
will not be lost if you change pages using these buttons. 
 
Please answer all questions to the best of your ability. 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
 
Reminder:  The information you report in this survey is held strictly confidential, will be 
kept anonymous whether you include your contact information or not, and will be used 
only for non-commercial research purposes. 
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All questions in this section refer to your actions as an individual angel investor. 
1. Years you've been investing your own capital in new 
businesses 
2. Number of new business investments you've made 
 
3. Number of these new business investments from which Required 
you've exited (include closures) 
4. Your years of experience working in new businesses 
 
5. Number of new businesses for which you've been a 
founding member of the leadership team 
6. Your years of experience working in large corporations 
(500+ people) 
Select 
7. Please name the angel groups with which you are Required 
affiliated. 
8. Year of birth 
 
9. Your highest level of education: Select 
 
In what field? 
10. Gender Select 
 
11. % of your wealth that you have invested directly in 
new businesses 
 
 
 
 
The following questions ask about each new business investment from which you've 
exited, one company at a time. Please complete the question sets starting with your most 
recent exited investment proceeding to your least recent exited investment. 
 
12. Business name 
13. Business headquarters location i.e. Portland, OR 
 
 
14. Business's primary industry of 
operation 
15. Your prior years of experience in 
that industry 
16. Stage of firm when you made your 
initial investment 
 
Select 
 
 
 
 
 
Select 
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Your most recent exited investment. This set of questions concerns your investment 
activity with the business identified on the previous screen. Include only cash investment, 
not 'sweat equity'. 
 
17. Year of initial investment 
 
18. Initial $ amount invested 
 
19. % of the business owned as a result of 
your initial investment 
Details of your first follow-on investment, 
if any 
 
 
 
 
 
Details of your second follow-on 
investment, if any 
 
 
 
 
 
26. Total of any other follow-on $'s YOU 
invested 
27. Prior 12 month revenues of this 
business when you made your initial 
investment 
28. Prior 12 month profitability of this 
business when you made your initial 
investment 
29. Number of other members of your group 
that invested with you at your initial 
investment 
30. Number of hours of due diligence you 
did before investing 
 
Year   20 
 
$$   21 
 
% of business owned after follow-on 
investment 22 
 
Year 23 
 
$$ 24 
 
% of business owned after follow-on 
investment.  25 
 
 
 
 
 
Select f rom these ranges 
Select f rom these ranges 
Select 
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Source of the deal (check all that apply)  
 
31. From your angel group's initial  35. The entrepreneur/s were referred to 
screening efforts you by friends 
 
32. From your angel group's main  36. The entrepreneur/s were referred to 
investment presentations you by business contacts 
 
33. You were personal friends with 37. Other 
the entrepreneur/s 
 
34. You had worked with the 
entrepreneur/s previously 
Select the top 3 risks / challenges facing this business at the time you initially 
invested (no more than 3) 
 
 
38. Technology still developing 43. Competitive threats 
 
39. Operational issues with volume 44. Required a lot of capital 
 
40. High customer concentration 45. Management team issues 
 
41. Fragmented customer base 46. Regulatory issues 
 
42. Challenging marketing channel 
Identify your role with the business (check all that apply)  
 
47. Served on board 52. Took a management position 
 
48. Served as board observer 53. Paid consultant 
 
49. Lead investor 54. Informal but active 
 
50. Represented your angel group in the deal 55. Substantially passive 
 
51. A "sounding board" for the entrepreneur 
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Management team experience at your initial investment (check all that apply) 
 
56. Founded and led other new 
ventures 
 
57. Other new ventures had 
succeeded 
 
58. Significant large firm experience 
 
59. Significant technical experience 
60. Significant managerial experience 
 
61. Significant sales/marketing 
experience 
 
62. I don't know 
 
63. Number of people on the founding team for this business 
 
64. Number of those founding team members still actively involved at the time of 
the exit 
 
65. Number of outside board members at exit 
(non managers, non friends/family) 
 
66. Total number of board of directors at exit 
 
 
 
Would you say the entrepreneurs leading this venture: 
 
67. Tried to directly influence how important factors in the 
market develop 
 
68. Tried to position the venture to benefit from expectations 
of a large and growing market 
Disagree ----Neutral ---- 
Agree 
   
 Would you say that the entrepreneurs in this venture 
emphasized: 
 
69. Acquiring the means needed in order to reach their 
 
Disagree ----Neutral ---- 
Agree 
existing goals 
 
70. Utilizing current means and capabilities to flexibly 
pursue new goals 
   
 
Would you say that the entrepreneurs in this venture 
typically prioritized: 
 
71. Making smaller investments focused on getting quickly 
 
Disagree ----Neutral ---- 
Agree 
to positive cash flow 
 
72. Making larger investments, staying on plan, even if it 
delayed positive cash flow 
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73. Year of exit event 
 
74. Type of exit event Select 
 
75. Ownership % at exit event 
 
76. Total cash distributions paid to you 
during investment period 
77. Total cash value paid to you as a result of 
the exit 
78. Total valuation of the firm at exit i.e. $0, 30M acquisition, 75M IPO valuation, etc. 
 
 
79. Your remaining ownership % after the i.e. 0% (sold whole stake), or 10% of firm, etc. 
exit event, if any 
80. Prior 12 month revenues of the business 
when the exit event occurred 
81. Prior 12 month profitability of the 
business when the exit event occurred 
82. Total amount of formal venture capital the 
business took on prior to your exit 
 
Select f rom these ranges 
 
 
Select f rom these ranges 
 
 
Select f rom these ranges 
 
83. Frequency of interaction with the business Select f rom these options: 
 
Instructions: 
 
You have completed questions concerning your investment in this company. If you need 
to edit any information entered for this business, click on the appropriate button in the 
"Steps" bar at the top of the page. 
 
To save your responses and advance to the next exit, click on the "Done with this 
company" button at the top of the page. 
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APPENDIX B – ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 
 
 
Table B1 - Panel A
Percentage of wealth - logistic regressions
-4.46*** -2.64*** -2.91*** -1.38*** -2.19*** -1.84***
(-7.11) (-5.40) (-5.58) (-2.98) (-4.06) (-3.65)
-0.23 0.05 0.05 0.16 0.11 0.06
(-1.09) (0.24) (0.20) (0.74) (0.49) (0.29)
-0.05 -0.01 -0.11 -0.14 -0.08 -0.06
(-0.69) (-0.10) (-1.29) (-1.56) (-1.07) (-0.71)
0.07*** 0.11***
(6.50) (9.36)
0.04*** 0.07***
(5.30) (9.83)
0.08*** 0.17***
(4.39) (5.70)
0.04** 0.07***
(2.27) (5.72)
0.01 0.11***
(0.60) (7.11)
cut1 -21.99*** -14.76*** -16.02*** -10.15*** -13.20*** -12.07***
(-8.26) (-6.93) (-7.14) (-5.05) (-5.73) (-5.49)
cut2 -20.03*** -12.85*** -14.11*** -8.27*** -11.30*** -10.18***
(-7.91) (-6.42) (-6.68) (-4.40) (-5.17) (-4.92)
cut3 -19.13*** -12.00*** -13.27*** -7.46*** -10.46*** -9.34***
(-7.59) (-6.01) (-6.31) (-3.99) (-4.80) (-4.54)
cut4 -18.75*** -11.65*** -12.92*** -7.12*** -10.11*** -9.01***
(-7.47) (-5.86) (-6.16) (-3.82) (-4.66) (-4.39)
cut5 -18.63*** -11.55*** -12.81*** -7.02*** -10.01*** -8.90***
(-7.42) (-5.80) (-6.09) (-3.75) (-4.61) (-4.33)
cut6 -17.29*** -10.35*** -11.59*** -5.87*** -8.85*** -7.76***
(-6.99) (-5.24) (-5.56) (-3.16) (-4.12) (-3.79)
cut7 -17.23*** -10.30*** -11.54*** -5.82*** -8.80*** -7.70***
(-6.97) (-5.22) (-5.54) (-3.13) (-4.09) (-3.77)
cut8 -17.08*** -10.17*** -11.42*** -5.70*** -8.68*** -7.59***
(-6.93) (-5.16) (-5.49) (-3.08) (-4.04) (-3.72)
N Firms Founded
Total Investments
Total Exits
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
with 
totalexits 
experience 
only
Age (Log)
Gender
Education
Years Investing
with 
numfounded 
experience 
only
with 
totalinv 
experience 
only
Years Entrepreneur
Variable
model with 
all 
experience 
variables
with 
yearsinv 
experience 
only
with 
yearsentre 
experience 
only
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cut9 -17.01*** -10.11*** -11.36*** -5.65*** -8.63*** -7.53***
(-6.90) (-5.13) (-5.46) (-3.05) (-4.02) (-3.69)
cut10 -15.79*** -9.05*** -10.35*** -4.70** -7.58*** -6.54***
(-6.48) (-4.63) (-4.99) (-2.54) (-3.57) (-3.22)
cut11 -15.60*** -8.88*** -10.20*** -4.56** -7.42*** -6.38***
(-6.41) (-4.54) (-4.92) (-2.46) (-3.50) (-3.15)
cut12 -15.16*** -8.48*** -9.86*** -4.21** -7.04*** -6.01***
(-6.24) (-4.32) (-4.75) (-2.27) (-3.33) (-2.96)
cut13 -15.09*** -8.41*** -9.79*** -4.14** -6.97*** -5.95***
(-6.21) (-4.29) (-4.72) (-2.23) (-3.30) (-2.93)
cut14 -14.33*** -7.68*** -9.13*** -3.47* -6.26*** -5.26***
(-5.93) (-3.93) (-4.41) (-1.88) (-2.98) (-2.61)
cut15 -13.89*** -7.24*** -8.72*** -3.08* -5.86*** -4.87**
(-5.75) (-3.72) (-4.23) (-1.67) (-2.80) (-2.42)
cut16 -13.54*** -6.90*** -8.42*** -2.77 -5.54*** -4.56**
(-5.59) (-3.54) (-4.08) (-1.50) (-2.64) (-2.26)
cut17 -13.49*** -6.85*** -8.37*** -2.73 -5.49*** -4.52**
(-5.56) (-3.51) (-4.04) (-1.47) (-2.62) (-2.23)
cut18 -13.22*** -6.58*** -8.12*** -2.48 -5.24** -4.27**
(-5.45) (-3.37) (-3.92) (-1.33) (-2.50) (-2.11)
cut19 -12.40*** -5.81*** -7.41*** -1.75 -4.49** -3.57*
(-5.12) (-2.96) (-3.56) (-0.94) (-2.15) (-1.76)
cut20 -12.33*** -5.75*** -7.35*** -1.69 -4.43** -3.51*
(-5.09) (-2.93) (-3.54) (-0.91) (-2.12) (-1.73)
cut21 -12.19*** -5.62*** -7.24*** -1.57 -4.31** -3.40*
(-5.06) (-2.88) (-3.49) (-0.84) (-2.07) (-1.68)
cut22 -10.94*** -4.51** -6.17*** -0.47 -3.11 -2.34
(-4.40) (-2.20) (-2.84) (-0.24) (-1.46) (-1.10)
cut23 -10.52*** -4.10** -5.76*** -0.05 -2.67 -1.93
(-4.20) (-1.98) (-2.62) (-0.03) (-1.24) (-0.90)
cut24 -9.82*** -3.40 -5.06** 0.65 -1.97 -1.23
(-3.85) (-1.60) (-2.26) (0.32) (-0.90) (-0.56)
631 637 639 639 637 641
0.08 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03
Constant
Constant
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
Note: A single asterisk (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 10-percent level, a double 
asterisk (**) indicates significance at the 5-percent level, and a triple asterisk (***) indicates 
significance at the 1-percent level.  Robust z-statistics are in parentheses.
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
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-5.64*** -4.65*** -5.55***
(-4.28) (-2.91) (-3.67)
-0.77* -1.11** -0.88**
(-1.88) (-2.34) (-1.98)
-0.10 -0.05 -0.18
(-0.72) (-0.33) (-1.27)
0.06*** 0.14*** 0.12***
(2.89) (4.66) (4.42)
0.08*** 0.07*** 0.10***
(4.63) (3.35) (4.64)
0.07** 0.10*** 0.07**
(2.01) (3.30) (2.14)
0.05*** 0.09*** 0.05**
(2.81) (4.16) (2.51)
0.02 0.01 0.03
(0.52) (0.28) (0.78)
0.52* -0.38 0.04
(1.67) (-0.83) (0.12)
-0.49
(-1.33)
-0.12 -0.21
(-0.20) (-0.47)
0.07 -0.02
(0.14) (-0.04)
-0.08** -0.11*** -0.07**
(-2.39) (-2.89) (-2.07)
0.18
(0.49)
Total Investments
Total Exits
TMT Experience
Management Risk
Stage: Seed
Stage: Startup
Co-investors
Source: Group Screening
source
N Firms Founded
Table B1 - Panel B
Percentage of Wealth - logistic regressions
Variable
Model with 
additional 
variables
mgmtrisk
Age (Log)
Gender
Education
Years Investing
Years Entrepreneur
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cut1 -25.34*** -21.29*** -24.77***
(-4.72) (-3.26) (-4.02)
cut2 -24.68*** -20.69*** -24.16***
(-4.62) (-3.20) (-3.96)
cut3 -24.26*** -20.17*** -23.69***
(-4.56) (-3.14) (-3.90)
cut4 -24.06*** -19.99*** -23.48***
(-4.52) (-3.11) (-3.86)
cut5 -22.41*** -18.50*** -21.89***
(-4.27) (-2.90) (-3.65)
cut6 -22.24*** -18.31*** -21.73***
(-4.25) (-2.87) (-3.63)
cut7 -22.14*** -18.26*** -21.69***
(-4.24) (-2.87) (-3.62)
cut8 -22.08*** -18.21*** -21.65***
(-4.23) (-2.86) (-3.62)
cut9 -20.48*** -16.42*** -19.81***
(-3.97) (-2.61) (-3.35)
cut10 -20.37*** -16.22** -19.67***
(-3.94) (-2.57) (-3.33)
cut11 -20.06*** -15.87** -19.41***
(-3.88) (-2.50) (-3.27)
cut12 -19.17*** -14.39** -18.15***
(-3.72) (-2.26) (-3.07)
cut13 -18.74*** -14.27** -17.89***
(-3.64) (-2.24) (-3.04)
cut14 -18.24*** -14.00** -17.44***
(-3.55) (-2.19) (-2.95)
cut15 -17.31*** -12.68** -16.34***
(-3.39) (-1.97) (-2.77)
cut16 -17.10*** -12.40* -16.12***
(-3.34) (-1.92) (-2.73)
cut17 -16.84*** -12.02* -15.86***
(-3.31) (-1.88) (-2.70)
cut18 -14.74*** -10.76 -14.37**
(-2.74) (-1.61) (-2.35)
192 135 163
0.13 0.17 0.16
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Note: A single asterisk (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 10-percent level, 
a double asterisk (**) indicates significance at the 5-percent level, and a triple asterisk 
(***) indicates significance at the 1-percent level.  Robust z-statistics are in parentheses.
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
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-24.48*** -20.51*** -20.88*** -13.18*** -13.39*** -13.34***
(-6.02) (-5.20) (-5.01) (-3.27) (-2.96) (-3.27)
0.92 2.07* 2.96** 3.09** 2.64** 2.95**
(0.83) (1.84) (2.23) (2.42) (1.97) (2.27)
0.05 0.59 -0.03 -0.46 0.17 0.32
(0.09) (0.88) (-0.04) (-0.64) (0.22) (0.40)
0.61*** 0.77***
(5.94) (8.10)
0.10* 0.43***
(1.81) (7.88)
0.75*** 1.30***
(2.94) (4.79)
0.20* 0.34***
(1.90) (2.84)
-0.20 0.59***
(-1.26) (5.23)
102.69*** 87.68*** 90.88*** 62.53*** 62.73*** 63.36***
(6.21) (5.45) (5.33) (3.82) (3.47) (3.78)
Observations 631 637 639 639 637 641
R-squared 0.25 0.19 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.06
Note: A single asterisk (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 10-percent level, a double asterisk (**) indicates significance 
at the 5-percent level, and a triple asterisk (***) indicates significance at the 1-percent level.  Robust z-statistics are in parentheses.
with totalinv 
experience only
with totalexits 
experience only
Age (Log)
Gender
Education
Years Investing
Years Entrepreneur
N Firms Founded
Total Investments
Total Exits
Constant
Table B2 - Panel A
Percentage of wealth - OLS regressions
Variable
 model with all 
experience 
variables
with yearsinv 
experience only
with yearsentre 
experience only
with numfounded 
experience only
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-23.65*** -17.75** -18.97**
(-3.34) (-2.11) (-2.43)
-0.81 -1.45 -1.76
(-0.40) (-0.76) (-0.95)
-0.86 -1.62 -1.94*
(-0.84) (-1.31) (-1.82)
0.63*** 1.09*** 1.10***
(3.16) (4.47) (4.32)
0.26*** 0.18 0.28***
(2.62) (1.50) (2.71)
0.39 0.54 0.36
(1.12) (1.47) (0.95)
0.19 0.26 0.07
(1.24) (1.57) (0.40)
-0.26 -0.33 -0.19
(-0.92) (-1.15) (-0.65)
3.99* 0.11 1.20
-1.68 (0.03) (0.38)
-0.28
(-0.12)
-1.87 -1.57
(-0.55) (-0.64)
-1.94 -1.07
(-0.71) (-0.47)
-0.28 -0.40** -0.31
(-1.36) (-2.52) (-1.20)
2.36
(0.73)
100.59*** 79.75** 83.79***
(3.48) (2.27) (2.62)
Observations 192 135 163
 R-squared 0.33 0.43 0.39
Note: A single asterisk (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 10-percent level, 
a double asterisk (**) indicates significance at the 5-percent level, and a triple asterisk 
(***) indicates significance at the 1-percent level.  Robust z-statistics in parentheses.
Constant
Total Exits
TMT Experience
Management Risk
Stage: Seed
Co-investors
Source: Group Screening
Stage: Startup
Table B2 - Panel B
Percentage of Wealth - OLS regressions
Variable Model with 
additional variables
mgmtrisk source
N Firms Founded
Total Investments
Age (Log)
Gender
Education
Years Investing
Years Entrepreneur
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Table B3 - Panel A
-38.18 -5.18 8.94 75.86 99.50 95.71
(-0.49) (-0.07) (0.11) (0.96) (1.23) (1.21)
-9.06 -9.72 3.55 10.62 9.21 7.97
(-0.28) (-0.30) (0.10) (0.32) (0.25) (0.23)
3.59 6.55 6.18 8.33 11.73 11.72
(0.29) (0.52) (0.46) (0.61) (0.84) (0.85)
7.23*** 6.92***
(3.14) (3.55)
1.41 3.94***
(0.93) (3.05)
5.08 9.09*
(1.04) (1.85)
-1.85 0.43
(-1.23) (0.44)
-2.73 1.87
(-1.07) (0.97)
140.64 8.38 -53.04 -308.21 -391.66 -376.03
(0.45) (0.03) (-0.17) (-0.98) (-1.21) (-1.19)
Observations 242 244 245 245 243 245
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: A single asterisk (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 10-percent level, a double asterisk (**) indicates significance at 
the 5-percent level, and a triple asterisk (***) indicates significance at the 1-percent level.  Robust z-statistics are in parentheses.
Total Exits
Constant
Total Investments
with totalinv 
experience only
with totalexits 
experience only
Gender
Education
Years Investing
Years Entrepreneur
N Firms Founded
Age (Log)
Post-investment interaction (times/year) - Tobit regressions
Variable
model with all 
experience 
variables
with yearsinv 
experience only
with yearsentre 
experience only
with numfounded 
experience only
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Table B3 - Panel B
75.69 42.19 67.91
(0.76) (0.37) (0.68)
-52.36 -41.66 -48.96
(-1.41) (-1.06) (-1.26)
-4.64 -16.02 -6.40
(-0.31) (-0.98) (-0.43)
6.15** 8.74** 8.21**
(2.44) (2.33) (2.48)
1.28 1.70 0.31
(0.69) (0.77) (0.17)
3.87 3.90 2.57
(0.79) (0.77) (0.54)
-0.50 -1.05 0.47
(-0.26) (-0.56) (0.27)
-8.32** -8.60* -7.81**
(-2.07) (-1.96) (-2.04)
30.49 26.80 10.84
(0.96) (0.62) (0.30)
66.95*
(1.84)
-55.35 -1.21
(-1.29) (-0.03)
-17.54 28.00
(-0.45) (0.79)
-8.98*** -6.52* -7.78**
(-2.67) (-1.68) (-2.12)
-40.40
(-1.41)
-216.47 -81.10 -189.34
(-0.55) (-0.18) (-0.48)
Observations 185 134 162
Pseudo R2 0.00 0.02 0.03
Constant
Note: A single asterisk (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 10-percent 
level, a double asterisk (**) indicates significance at the 5-percent level, and a triple 
asterisk (***) indicates significance at the 1-percent level.  Robust z-statistics in 
parentheses.
Total Investments
Total Exits
TMT Expereince
Management Risk
Stage: Seed
Stage: Startup
Co-investors
Source: Group screening
N Firms Founded
Post-investment interaction (times/year) - Tobit regressions
Variable
model with 
additional 
variables
mgmtrisk source
Age (Log)
Gender
Education
Years Investing
Years Entrepreneur
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-25.13 4.09 9.28 57.37 76.37 74.38
(-0.46) (0.08) (0.17) (1.02) (1.33) (1.32)
-2.58 -1.37 6.96 11.70 11.14 11.39
(-0.11) (-0.06) (0.28) (0.49) (0.43) (0.46)
0.17 3.13 2.62 4.01 7.28 7.12
(0.02) (0.36) (0.29) (0.43) (0.77) (0.76)
5.00*** 4.76***
(3.20) (3.58)
1.26 2.94***
(1.28) (3.48)
4.25 6.89**
(1.43) (2.26)
-1.80 -0.09
(-1.64) (-0.14)
-1.78 0.82
(-1.02) (0.64)
119.65 0.26 -25.36 -207.50 -272.55 -267.64
(0.54) (0.00) (-0.12) (-0.92) (-1.18) (-1.19)
Observations 242 244 245 245 243 245
R-squared 0.14 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.02
Years Entrepreneur
Table B4 - Panel A
Post-investment interaction (times/year) - OLS regressions
Variable
model with all 
experience 
variables
with yearsinv 
experience only
with yearsentre 
experience only
with 
numfounded 
experience only
with totalinv 
experience only
with totalexits 
experience only
Age (Log)
Gender
Education
Years Investing
N Firms Founded
Total Investments
Total Exits
Constant
Note: A single asterisk (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 10-percent level, a double asterisk (**) indicates 
significance at the 5-percent level, and a triple asterisk (***) indicates significance at the 1-percent level.  Robust z-
statistics are in parentheses.
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-23.65*** -17.75** -18.97**
(-3.34) (-2.11) (-2.43)
-0.81 -1.45 -1.76
(-0.40) (-0.76) (-0.95)
-0.86 -1.62 -1.94*
(-0.84) (-1.31) (-1.82)
0.63*** 1.09*** 1.10***
(3.16) (4.47) (4.32)
0.26*** 0.18 0.28***
(2.62) (1.50) (2.71)
0.39 0.54 0.36
(1.12) (1.47) (0.95)
0.19 0.26 0.07
(1.24) (1.57) (0.40)
-0.26 -0.33 -0.19
(-0.92) (-1.15) (-0.65)
3.99* 0.11 1.20
(1.68) (0.03) (0.38)
-0.28
(-0.12)
-1.87 -1.57
(-0.55) (-0.64)
-1.94 -1.07
(-0.71) (-0.47)
-0.28 -0.40** -0.31
(-1.36) (-2.52) (-1.20)
2.36
(0.73)
100.59*** 79.75** 83.79***
(3.48) (2.27) (2.62)
Observations 192 135 163
R-squared 0.30 0.37 0.39
Table B4 - Panel B
Variable Model with     
additional variables
Management and 
stage risk
Source
Post-investment interaction (times/year) - OLS regressions
Stage: Startup
Age (Log)
Gender
Education
Years Investing
Years Entrepreneur
N Firms Founded
Total Investments
Total Exits
TMT Experience
Management Risk
Stage: Seed
Constant
Note: A single asterisk (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 10-percent 
level, a double asterisk (**) indicates significance at the 5-percent level, and a triple 
asterisk (***) indicates significance at the 1-percent level.  Robust z-statistics are in 
parentheses.
Co-investors
Source: Group Screening
